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Tax Consequences of Shareholders’ Rent-Free Use of 
Corporate Property 
David Elkins∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Paulina du Pont, born August 18, 1903, was the great-great-
granddaughter of the legendary Pierre Samuel du Pont de Nemours (1739-
1817), forbearer of one of America’s wealthiest families.1  One hundred and 
one years before her birth, Paulina’s great-grandfather, Eleuthère Irénée du 
Pont, founded what would become E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company,2 
currently one of the world’s largest chemical companies3 and one of thirty 
companies composing the Dow Jones Industrial Average.4 
Before her marriage to collegiate golf champion Junius Simpson Dean 
in 1923,5 Paulina had purchased a home for over $200,0006 and continued 
after her marriage to spend large sums on its upkeep and improvement.7  
Soon after their marriage, Paulina and Junius organized a personal holding 
company named, appropriately, the Nemours Corporation.  Paulina was 
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 Our Family History, Pedigree Chart for Paulina du Pont, http://gentree.usgenfiles.com/pedigre 




 Encyclopedia Britannica, du Pont Family, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/172546/ 
du-Pont-family (last visited April 14, 2010).  
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 Fortune 500, CNN Money, http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/2008/industrie 
s/7/index.html (last visited April 14, 2010). 
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 Dow Jones Indexes, http://www.djindexes.com/ (Dow Jones Averages/Current Component 
Report) (last visited April 14, 2010).   
 
5
 Milestones: May 12, 1923, Paulina du Pont, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171 
,846048,00.html (last visited April 14, 2010); see supra note 1. 
 
6
 When the first housing census was taken about twenty years later the average price of a home 




 Dean v. Comm’r, 9 T.C. 256 at 263 (1947), aff’d 187 F.2d 1019 at 1019 (3d Cir. 1951); Dean v. 
Comm’r, 187 F.2d 1019 at 1019-20 (3d Cir. 1951). Hereinafter the decision by the Tax Court will be 
referred to as “Dean I, T.C.,” the Third Circuit’s decision will be referred to as “Dean I, 3d Cir.,” and 
Dean I, T.C. and Dean I, 3d Cir. will be referred to collectively as “Dean I.” 
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vice president of the company and owned eighty percent of the stock.  Ju-
nius was president and owned the remaining twenty percent.8 
Paulina Dupont Dean, Junius Simpson Dean, the Nemours Corpora-
tion, and Paulina’s house were destined to play critical roles in the devel-
opment of the law of income taxation. 
In 1931, Nemours owed $600,000 to the Chase National Bank, which 
was concerned over the corporation’s relatively thin capitalization.  It de-
manded that Paulina transfer the home in which she and her husband lived 
to the corporation.  She did so.  Following the transfer the family continued 
to live in the house as before.9 
In auditing the returns of Paulina and Junius for the 1939 tax year, the 
Commissioner noted that they were using what was now corporate property 
without paying the corporation any rent.  He determined, therefore, that the 
use value of that property was taxable income.  As this was before the era of 
joint returns, he allocated the income in accordance with the couple’s 
shareholdings: eighty percent to Paulina and twenty percent to Junius.10 
The Tax Court, to which the couple filed a petition, upheld the Com-
missioner’s determination that the personal use of corporate property con-
stituted taxable income but disagreed with the Commissioner’s allocation of 
that income.  The court ruled that Junius, who bore the responsibility of 
providing a home for his family, had received use of the property in his 
capacity as president of the corporation and that the use value of the proper-
ty was properly taxable to him as compensation.11  The Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit affirmed.12 
The reluctance of the Tax Court to view the benefit as deriving from 
shareholding and its preference, instead, to consider it compensation for 
services was tested in other cases, where corporate property was used rent-
free by shareholders who had provided no services to the corporation.  In 
these situations, the use of the property could not be classified as compen-
sation.  For a while, the courts dabbled with the idea that where the share-
holder did not provide any services to the corporation, the free use of corpo-
rate property should be considered a tax-free gift to the shareholders.13  
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 Dean I, T.C at 263-64; Dean I, 3d Cir. at 1020. 
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 Dean I, T.C at 267-68. (despite the fact that Paulina was vice president of the company, the Tax 
Court held that “Paulina duPont Dean rendered no services to the corporation”).  
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 Dean I, 3d Cir. at 1020.  Similar results were reached in Reynard Corp. v. Comm’r, 30 B.T.A. 
451 (1934); Frueauff v. Comm’r, 30 B.T.A. 449 (1934); Levy v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 1984-306, 48 
T.C.M. (CCH) 293 (1984).  In Motel Co. v. Comm’r, 340 F.2d 445 at 448-49 (2nd Cir. 1965), use of a 
corporation’s property by its president and CEO was ruled a gift.  For current statutory treatment of 
“gifts” to employees, see I.R.C. § 102(c)(1) (2009). 
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 Hillman v. Comm’r, 71 F.2d 688 (3rd  Cir. 1934); Richards v. Comm’r, 111 F.2d 376 (5th Cir. 
1940); Peacock v. Comm’r, 256 F.2d 160 at 162 (5th Cir. 1958) (“[W]here the owners of the stock of a 
corporation occupy a residence owned by it and there is no evidence that the rental value was to be 
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However, they eventually decided that the rent-free use of corporate proper-
ty by shareholders is properly classified as a constructive dividend.14 
A parallel question concerns the tax consequences to the corporation 
itself.  Does allowing its shareholders to use its property without paying 
rent constitute a realization of taxable gain for the corporation?15  Although 
the courts did not address this question directly, a negative answer is clearly 
indicated.  Income tax is imposed on “all income from whatever source 
derived.”16  As the corporation receives no rent for the use of its property 
(nor is it contractually entitled to receive any rent), there is no income on 
which it can be taxed.17 
                                                                                                                           
received as compensation for services, such rental value is a gift from the corporation to the stockhold-
ers and is not to be treated as taxable income.”). 
 
14
 Chandler v. Comm’r, 119 F.2d 623 at 627 (3d  Cir. 1941) (“Reasoning such as that advanced in 
the Hillman case that a gift is presumed because of the family relationship between the parties over-
looks, we think, the fact that a corporation is not ’related’ to its stockholders, directors and officers. That 
purely artificial modern concept, the stock company, does not form a segment in the oldest of all human 
relationships, the family circle. The corporate "person" may be deemed by a fiction of the law to have 
abilities normally ascribed to man but that fiction cannot be indulged to the extent of endowing the 
corporation with feelings of love and affection for its stockholders, officers and directors. It is only 
because of the love and affection which a normal human donor feels for members of his family that it is 
presumed by the law that a transfer of property by him to them is a gift. The basis for such a presump-
tion is entirely absent when the donor is a corporation.”); Campbell .v Comm’r, T.C. Memo 1961-166, 
T.C.M. (CCH) 825 (1961); Challenge Mfg. Co. v. Comm’r, 37 T.C. 650 (1962); United Aniline Co. v. 
Comm’r, 316 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1963); Comm’r v. Riss, 374 F.2d 161 at 169 (1967); Ashby v. Comm’r, 
50 T.C. 409 (1968); Int’l Artists, Ltd. v. Comm’r, 55 T.C. 94 at 107 (1970); Whipple Chrysler-Plymouth 
v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 1972-55, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 230 (1972); Nicholls, North, Buse Co. v. Comm’r, 
56 T.C. 1225 at 1238 (1971); Crosby v. United States, 496 F.2d 1384 (1974); Loftin & Woodard, Inc. v. 
United States, 577 F.2d 1206 at 1214 (1978) (“When a corporation confers an economic benefit upon a 
shareholder, in his capacity as such, without an expectation of reimbursement, that economic benefit 
becomes a constructive dividend, taxable to the respective shareholder.”); Finney v. Comm’r, T.C. 
Memo 1980-23, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 938 (1980);  Uranga v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 1983-373, 46 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 567 (1983); Tanner v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 1983-230, 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 1419 (1983); Cirelli v. 
Comm’r, 82 T.C. 335 (1984); Royce C. McDougal, M.D., Inc. v. Comm’r, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 731; Mel-
vin v. Comm’r, 88 T.C. 63 (1987); Stan Frisbie, Inc. v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 1190-419, 60 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 440 (1990); Gil v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 1994-92, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 2311 (1994); Smith v. 
Comm’r, T.C. Memo 1995-410, 70  T.C.M. 502 (1995); Yarbrough Oldsmobile Cadillac v. Comm’r, 
T.C. Memo 1995-538, 70 T.C.M. (CCH) 1282 (1995); Roy v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 1997-562, 74 T. 
C.M. (CCH) 1428 (1997). 
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 Because the recipient of the benefit is a shareholder and not, for example, an employee or other 
service provider, no question arises as to whether the corporation may deduct the expense.  However, we 
will need to consider the effect of allowing shareholder rent-free use of corporate property on the earn-
ings and profits of the corporation.  See infra note 130 and the surrounding text. 
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 In Helvering v. Indep. Life Ins. Co., 292 U.S. 371 (1934), the Supreme Court ruled unconstitu-
tional a Congressional attempt to impose tax on the rental value of owner-occupied property.  The same 
principle would bar Congress from imposing tax on the rent value of property occupied rent-free by 
shareholders: in the absence of actual income, the imposition of tax would constitute a tax on property 
not apportioned among the states. 
Several decisions of the Tax Court, and its predecessor the Board of Tax Appeals, imply that a cor-
poration derives no taxable gain from allowing shareholders to use its property rent-free.  In Reynard, 
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Thus, the law with regard to the rent-free use of corporate property by 
shareholders appears to be relatively straightforward.  The corporation need 
not report any income, and the shareholder must report the use value of the 
property as a dividend.18  Nevertheless, a deeper analysis will show that the 
situation is anything but simple.  Indeed, it turns out that the issues that 
arise with regard to this seemingly straightforward transaction are funda-
mental to the whole concept of income taxation in general and the corporate 
tax regime in particular. 
The tax consequences of rent-free use of corporate property by share-
holders have received little attention from the courts since the 1950s and 
even less from commentators.  The Code and regulations do not provide 
any specific guidance, but instead rely on general principles of income tax.  
Perhaps the reason is that it just seems too simple.  Nonetheless, an ostensi-
                                                                                                                           
the Board of Tax Appeals determined that the rent-free use of corporate property by an individual who 
was both the sole shareholder and president of the corporation was compensation (supra note 12).  It 
further held that the corporation had no gross income.  The two determinations appear contradictory.  If 
the use of property was consideration for services, it necessarily follows that that in return for the use of 
its property, the corporation received services.  Those services would constitute realized income. 
Nonetheless, despite, or perhaps because of, this internal inconsistency, Reynard supports the con-
tention that a corporation allowing its shareholders rent-free use of property experiences no gross in-
come.  The court ignored the services that the corporation received and held that allowing its property to 
be used rent-free does not generate gross income for the corporation.  This rule would apply, a fortiori, 
when the corporation allowed shareholders to use its property and received, in fact, nothing in return. 
See Melvin v. Comm’r, 88 T.C. 63 at 83 (1987) (“[A] corporation is not entitled to deduct the costs 
of owning corporate property that are attributable to the personal use of the property by its sharehold-
ers.”).  Unstated but implicit in the court’s reasoning is that allowing shareholders to use its property 
produces no gross income for the corporation; otherwise, the expenses would clearly be deductible as 
necessary for generating that income.).  See also Hal E. Roach Studios v. Comm’r, 20 B.T.A. 917; 
Challenge Manufacturing Co. v. Comm’r, 37 T.C. 650 (1962); Levy v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 1984-306, 
48 T.C.M. (CCH) 293 (1984). 
In Combs Lumber, infra note 20, and Society Brand Clothes, infra note 21, the Board of Tax Ap-
peals and the Tax Court held that a corporation does not have gross income by lending money to share-
holders interest free. The same principle would apparently apply in the case of rent-free use of property. 
 
18
 Where the shareholder is itself a corporation, § 482 of the Code might be applicable. This 
section provides that: 
In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses…owned or controlled directly or 
indirectly by the same interests, the Secretary may…allocate gross income…if he determines that 
such…allocation…is necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income 
of any such organizations, trades, or businesses. 
At one time, the courts held that gross income could not be allocated under § 482 unless there was 
actually income to allocate.  Thus, in Tennessee-Arkansas Gravel Co. v. Comm’r, 112 F.2d 508 (6th Cir. 
1940), the Sixth Circuit refused to allow the Commissioner to impute income to a corporation that 
allowed a sister corporation to use its property rent-free, holding that “[§ 482] did not authorize the 
Commissioner to set up income where none existed.”  However, today it is clear that the Commissioner 
has that authority.  In the specific case of rent-free use of tangible property, Treas. Reg. 1.482-2(c) 
provides that the Commissioner may make appropriate allocations to reflect an arm’s length rental 
charge. 
The focus of this article is on shareholders who are individuals and whose use of corporate property 
is not within the framework of a trade or business, thus obviating the application of § 482. 
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bly similar type of transaction has received a tremendous amount of atten-
tion by courts, commentators and Congress.  For a generation the courts 
struggled to come to grips with the taxation of interest-free loans from cor-
porations to their shareholders until Congress finally had to step in and pro-
vide a comprehensive legislative solution. 
As we shall see, the courts for the most part rejected the analogy be-
tween rent-free use of property and interest-free use of money and refused 
to apply to the latter the principles that had guided them in dealing with the 
former.  When the path they chose proved impassable, Congress provided a 
legislative solution for the taxation of interest-free loans. 
This article will analyze the tax consequences of rent-free use of cor-
porate property by shareholders.19  It will demonstrate that, despite the ap-
parent similarities between rent-free use of property and interest-free use of 
money, there is an important difference, which can complicate analogizing 
from one to the other: what are purportedly loan proceeds can be bifurcated 
and recharacterized whereas rent-free use of property cannot.  Interestingly, 
this difference played no part in the development of the case law.  The sup-
posed difference, upon which the courts relied when refusing to apply to 
interest-free loans the case law as it had developed with regard to rent-free 
use of property, is illusory. 
In framing its legislative solution, Congress focused, advertently or 
not, on that particular aspect of interest-free loans that distinguishes them 
conceptually from rent-free use of property.  This difference, more than any 
express words in the Code, makes the legislative solution to the problem of 
taxing interest-free loans inapplicable to situations involving the rent-free 
use of property and necessitates an independent analysis of the tax conse-
quences of rent-free use of corporate property by shareholders. 
For the purpose of our discussion, it is crucial to distinguish between 
rent-free use of corporate property by shareholders (or any other uncom-
pensated service provided by a corporation to its shareholders), on the one 
hand, and barter transactions, on the other.  When goods or services are 
exchanged, each party to the transaction receives actual, non-cash income.  
As the word “income,” as used both in the Constitution and in the Code, is 
clearly not restricted to cash but rather includes also money’s worth, the 
goods or services received clearly constitute income.  For example, where 
an employee is allowed personal use of the employer’s property there is a 
barter transaction: use of property in exchange for services.  In fact, it is 
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 For the sake of convenience, this article will not refer to use of corporate property for below-
market rent.  Nevertheless, any reference to rent-free use should be read as also including use for which 
rent is paid at below-market rates.  Similarly, interest-free loans include loans at below market interest. 
See, e.g., Comm’r v. Greenspun, 670 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1982) (loan at 3 percent interest when market 
rate was 6 percent). 
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inaccurate to refer to the employee’s use of the property as “rent-free.”  The 
employee actually pays rent and the employer actually receives rent, al-
though instead of paying for the use of the property in cash, the employee 
pays in kind.  Analyzing the tax consequences of barter transactions in-
volves adapting rules fashioned primarily for cash income and cash expend-
itures to situations in which the income or the expense is not in the form of 
cash. 
With regard to rent-free use of corporate property by shareholders, the 
use actually is rent-free.  The corporation receives no goods or services in 
exchange for allowing its shareholders to use its property.  In tax terminol-
ogy, allowing its shareholders to use its property rent-free does not generate 
any gross income for the corporation.  The focus of this article will be on 
the consequences, both to the corporation and to the shareholders, of the 
fact that the shareholders’ use of corporate property is in fact rent-free. 
Part II traces the development of the case law regarding the taxation of 
interest free loans from 1940 through 1984 and the legislative solution 
eventually provided by Congress with the addition of § 7872 to the Code.  
It analyzes the issues faced by the courts and explains why the courts were 
unable to mold a satisfactory solution to the issues raised by such loans.  It 
then explores the structure of § 7872 and argues that Congress did not break 
from traditional tax principles but rather imposed a construction that the 
courts could and probably should have adopted on their own. 
Part III shows that the legislative solution to the problem of interest-
free loans is inapplicable to rent-free use of property.  By its language, § 
7872 applies only to interest-free loans.  More importantly, the underlying 
principles, which the courts could have adopted on their own with regard to 
interest-free loans, are unavailable in the case of rent-free use of property 
because § 7872 relies on that particular feature of interest-free use of money 
(namely, that the loan proceed can be bifurcated and recharacterized) that 
distinguishes it from rent-free use of property. 
Part IV analyzes the taxation of rent-free use of corporate property in 
light of the issues that caused the courts such difficulties when they con-
fronted the problem of interest-free loans.  It shows how the courts could 
have overcome the dilemmas they faced and how those solutions are appli-
cable to the case of rent-free use of property.  It also challenges the case 
law’s determination that the economic benefit enjoyed by shareholders who 
use corporate property rent-free is properly classified as a dividend. 
Part V compares the tax consequences of rent-free use of corporate 
property with those of an economically equivalent transaction in which the 
corporation rents property to its shareholders and then distributes as a divi-
dend the rent received and will contend with the argument that the relative-
ly light taxation of the former indicates a flaw in the analysis.  The explana-
tion for such a discrepancy is inherent in the corporate tax structure itself: 
non-integrated and partially integrated systems impose different burdens of 
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taxation on distributed corporate earnings and on income derived directly 
by individuals.  To demonstrate that the source of the horizontal inequity is 
the corporate tax structure and not any flaw in the analysis, the taxation of 
the two transactions is compared under various models of corporate taxa-
tion involving full integration. 
Part VI summarizes the findings.  
II.  THE TAXATION OF INTEREST-FREE LOANS FROM COMBS LUMBER TO 
SECTION 7872 
A.  Income for the Corporation? 
The Board of Tax Appeals first confronted the issue of interest-free 
loans from a corporation to its shareholders in 1940.20  Combs Lumber lent 
money to its shareholders and they, in return, signed notes promising to 
repay the loans along with interest at the rate of six percent.  Notwithstand-
ing the express provisions of the notes, the shareholders testified that at the 
time the notes were issued it had been understood by all parties concerned 
that the shareholders would not be charged interest by the corporation and, 
furthermore, that no interest had in fact ever been paid.  In attempting to 
impose tax on the corporation for the stated interest, the Commissioner ar-
gued that the stated interest actually was owed, actually did accrue, and 
was, therefore, income in the hands of the corporation.  Furthermore, he 
argued that oral evidence contradicting the content of the notes was barred 
by the parole evidence rule. 
The court rejected both of the Commissioner’s arguments.  With re-
gard to the procedural argument, it held that the parole evidence rule is not 
applicable in Tax Court.  With regard to the factual argument, it accepted 
the shareholder’s testimony and found that interest neither accrued nor was 
paid.  It went on to conclude that a taxpayer who does not receive and who 
is not entitled to receive income does not experience any taxable gain.  
Twelve years later, in Society Brand Clothes,21 the Tax Court encountered a 
similar fact pattern and reached similar conclusions. 
The rule that corporations experience no taxable income when lending 
money to their shareholders interest-free, conforms to the rule we saw earli-
er whereby corporations do not experience any taxable income when they 
allow shareholders to use corporate property without paying rent.  These 
rules are unremarkable.  Barring a specific statutory provision, income tax 
is imposed on the actual income of a taxpayer, not the income a taxpayer 
could have earned by employing property or skills in the most productive 
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 Combs Lumber Co. v. Comm’r, 41 B.T.A. 339 (1940). 
 
21
 Soc’y Brand Clothes, Inc. v. Comm’r, 18 T.C. 304 (1952). 
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manor.  A taxpayer who neither received nor is entitled to income need not 
report any.22 
B.  Deduction for the Shareholder? 
Six years after Combs Lumber, the Tax Court had an opportunity to 
consider whether when shareholders borrow money interest free from a 
corporation they control, they are entitled to an interest deduction.23  From 
1930 to 1939 Howell Turpentine Company lent money to its controlling 
shareholder, Mr. D.F. Howell.  During this time the corporation carried the 
obligation on its books without charging the shareholder any interest.  In 
1940 the corporation was liquidated, which resulted in a large gain for Mr. 
Howell.  In consequence, he asked the auditor to compute the interest on 
the average yearly balances, paid that amount to the corporation, and 
claimed a deduction for the interest paid.  The Tax Court found that the 
shareholder and the corporation had not contracted for interest to be paid 
and disallowed the deduction.24 
In both Combs Lumber and Howell Turpentine the inquiry was primar-
ily factual.  The question the court faced was whether or not the loans bore 
interest.  Once it determined, as a finding of fact, that the loans were inter-
est free, the court immediately concluded that the corporation need not re-
port interest income and that the shareholder is not entitled to an interest 
deduction. 
Later, in D. Loveman & Sons, the Tax Court stated “the general rule – 
that interest may not be accrued where there is no obligation to pay inter-
est.”25 
Then things started getting interesting. 
C.  Income for the Shareholder? 
Nemours was a successful corporation and its shareholders, Junius and 
Paulina Dean, wanted to withdraw some of Nemours’ cash. The problem 
was that taking out the cash as a dividend would have subjected them to tax 
at the rate of ninety-one percent.26 Therefore, instead of withdrawing the 
cash as a dividend, they borrowed money from the corporation and in ex-
change delivered to the corporation non-interest bearing notes.  By the end 
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 See supra note 17. 
 
23
 Howell Turpentine Co. v. Comm’r, 6 T.C. 364 (1946), rev’d on other grounds, 162 F.2d 316 
(5th Cir. 1947). 
 
24
 The parties agreed, and the court so held, that under the circumstances the corporation need not 
report any interest income.  6 T.C. at 394. 
 
25
 D. Loveman & Sons Export Corp. v. Comm’r, 34 T.C. 776 at 805-06 (1960).  The Board of Tax 
Appeals reached a similar result in a case not involving a corporation-shareholder relationship in A. 
Brackus, Jr. & Sons v. Comm’r, 6 B.T.A. 590 (1927). 
 
26
 Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub.L. 83-591, 68A Stat. 5, § 1 (1954). 
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of 1956, they owed upwards of two and a half million dollars (worth about 
twenty million present-day dollars), for which they neither paid nor were 
obliged to pay interest.  As the withdrawal was a loan and not a dividend, 
they paid no tax on the money they received.27 
The Commissioner did not argue that Nemours was obligated to pay 
tax on the interest it could have received had it lent the money at the market 
rate of interest instead of interest-free.  Apparently, that was a battle he 
knew he could not win, as his defeat in Combs Lumber and Society Brand 
Clothes had convincingly demonstrated.28  Instead, he directed his attention 
to the shareholders and argued that, by being able to use corporate funds 
interest-free, they had received a taxable benefit.29  In support of his conten-
tion, the Commissioner relied on the ruling in Dean I and in similar cases 
that rent-free use of corporate property by shareholders or officers consti-
tutes taxable income.  He argued that if rent-free use of property is taxable, 
so is interest-free use of money.30 
The Commissioner’s argument is extremely persuasive.  Unless it were 
willing to overturn its own (and several Circuit Courts’) previous decisions 
regarding rent-free use of property, the Tax Court would seem compelled to 
come to the same conclusion with regard to interest-free use of money.  
Nonetheless, the Tax Court, while reaffirming its decision in Dean I, re-
jected the Commissioner’s position in Dean II, and held that the interest-
free use of corporate funds does not constitute income in the hands of a 
shareholder. 
The Tax Court’s decision in Dean II relied upon two lines of reason-
ing.  The first was that interest-free use of money is essentially different 
than rent-free use of property.  The court noted that in those cases of rent-
free use of property relied upon by the Commissioner, the rent, had it been 
paid, would not have been deductible by the shareholders.  In contrast, had 
the shareholders in Dean II paid interest, they would have been able to de-
duct it (prior to 1986, almost all interest payments were deductible, the pri-
mary exception being where the loan proceeds were invested in tax-free 
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 Dean v. Comm’r, 35 T.C. 1083 (1961) (hereinafter Dean II). 
 
28
 Even in the earlier cases, the Commissioner had not contended that the corporation must report 
income that it neither received nor was entitled to receive.  Rather, relying on the fact that the share-
holders had signed notes requiring them to pay interests and on the parole evidence rule which he ar-
gued disqualified any contradictory oral evidence, the Commissioner claimed that the corporation was 
actually entitled to receive interest and should be taxed accordingly.  Once the court rejected the factual 
argument, the conclusion was self-evident.  In Dean II, the notes were on their face non-interest bearing. 
 
29
 In quantifying the benefit, the Commissioner assumed that the taxpayers could have borrowed 
money at the prime rate of interest. 
 
30
 Dean II, supra note 27, at 18. 
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bonds).31  Thus, if the rent-free loans were considered gross income, they 
would be offset by the interest deduction.32 
The second reason was that “[w]e have hitherto given full force to in-
terest-free loans, holding that they result in no interest deduction for the 
borrower nor interest income to the lender.  We think it equally true that an 
interest-free loan results in no taxable gain to the borrower, and we hold 
that the Commissioner is not entitled to any increased deficiency based 
upon this issue.”33 
Neither of the two lines of reasoning stands up under close scrutiny. 
Let us consider each of them in turn. 
The first ground was that interest-free use of money is different than 
rent-free use of property because, as opposed to rent, interest, had it been 
paid, would have been deductible.  In a concurring opinion, Judge Opper 
convincingly refuted that argument by noting that neither of the two pre-
sumptions—i.e. that interest is deductible and that rent is not—is necessari-
ly true.  Suppose a shareholder who receives rent-free use of corporate 
property sub-leases the property to a third party.  Presumably the sharehold-
er, having included the rental value of the property in gross income, could 
deduct that same amount as an expense of earning income.  On the other 
hand, assume that a shareholder who borrowed money interest-free from 
the corporation invested the funds in tax-free bonds;34  in which case the 
interest would not be deductible.35  In other words, the deductibility or non-
deductibility of either rent or interest cannot be presumed and depends upon 
the facts of the particular case.36 
The second ground was that the court had previously given “full force 
to interest-free loans.”37  In other words, the court claimed to be following 
its own precedents, which established that interest-free loans have no tax 
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consequences for either the lender or the borrower.  However, a closer ex-
amination reveals that the decision in Dean II is incompatible with the pre-
vious decisions the court cites.  Giving “full force” to interest-free loans 
entails accepting that a loan can actually be interest-free.  The alternative 
would be to deny that there can exist, for tax purposes, such a thing as an 
interest-free loan and to consider the borrower as having paid interest and 
the lender as having received interest.38  Giving “full force” to interest-free 
loans does not mean ignoring them for income tax purpose but rather deriv-
ing the appropriate income tax consequences from the presumption that 
they are in fact interest-free. 
In Dean II, the starting point for the Commissioner’s argument was 
that the loans were interest free.  Only where the use of money is interest 
free (or, more precisely, only when the interest charged is less than the mar-
ket rate) does the shareholder receive any economic benefit from the loan.  
Thus it was actually the Commissioner who gave “full force” to the inter-
est-free loans.  The court, on the other hand, rejected the Commissioner’s 
argument by holding that, had the shareholders paid interest, they would 
have been entitled to a deduction.  In other words, the court determined the 
income tax consequences by considering what would have happened had 
the loan not been interest-free, an analysis contradicting the “full force to 
interest-free loans” position it had adopted in the cases it cited. 
Despite the flaws in the Tax Court’s reasoning, the Commissioner did 
not appeal the decision.  Moreover, he waited a full twelve years before 
finally issuing a non-acquiescence and again litigating the issue.39  One 
might assume that in doing so, the Commissioner would have adopted the 
position taken in Dean II by Judge Bruce in dissent, and implied in the con-
curring opinion by Judge Opper; namely that the economic benefit inherent 
in the interest-free use of corporate funds is gross income and that the ques-
tion of whether the shareholder is entitled to an offsetting deduction should 
be determined on a case-by-case basis.  However, the Commissioner went 
beyond that.  He argued that, while the economic benefit of the interest-free 
loan is gross income, there can never be an interest deduction.  Section 
163(a) of the Code allows a deduction for interest “paid or accrued.”  See-
ing as interest was neither paid nor accrued—the loan, after all, was interest 
free—the Commissioner contended that no deduction was permissible.40 
The Fourth Circuit was the first to consider the Commissioner’s argu-
ment.41  In a short decision it declared the Dean rational persuasive, as ap-
plied to the fact of the case before it, and affirmed the Tax Court’s decision.  
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While the court did not specify what it meant by the qualifying phrase “as 
applied to the fact of this case,”42  it is reasonable to assume that the court 
was referring to situations in which interest, had it been paid, would have 
been deductible.  The court was apparently withholding judgment on the 
question of whether Dean II would continue to apply if, for example, the 
shareholder had invested the borrowed funds in tax-free bonds. 
A year later the issue was brought before the Fifth Circuit.43  The Tax 
Court had reiterated the Dean II rule and had held that an interest-free loan 
produced no gross income;44 the Commissioner argued that there was gross 
income and no corresponding deduction.  The Court of Appeals affirmed.  
In a long and vigorous dissent, Judge Goldberg rejected both the Dean 
II approach and the Commissioner’s position and opted for a middle path, 
similar to that of Judges Opper and Bruce in Dean II, but further developed. 
In essence he presented a form-over-substance analysis, arguing that the 
receipt of an interest-free loan is equivalent to receiving cash and then bor-
rowing at prevailing interest rates and that the tax consequences of the two 
scenarios should therefore be identical.45  Thus, he claimed that the econom-
ic value of the interest-free loan (what the borrower would have had to pay 
for the use of money at prevailing interest rates) should be considered gross 
income, while the interest the borrower would have had to pay for a market 
loan should be considered an income expense.  He emphasized, however, 
that the income and expense need to be taken into account separately and 
not netted one against the other.  Even when it is recognized that the bor-
rower, in effect, incurs an interest expense, there may be bottom-line in-
come tax consequences to the loan.  As already pointed out by the concur-
ring and dissenting opinions in Dean II, interest paid or accrued is not nec-
essarily deductable, as when the funds are investing in tax-free bonds.  But 
Judge Goldberg noted that even when the interest would have been deduct-
ible, the result is not necessarily a wash.  The deduction of interest may 
require the taxpayer to itemize deductions, meaning that those taxpayers 
who prefer the standard deduction are not entitled to deduct the interest;46 
the rule in Dean II in effect allows the taxpayer to claim both the interest 
deduction and the standard deduction.  Miscellaneous deductions are only 
allowed to the extent they exceed a given percentage of adjusted gross in-
come.
47
  Thus, even if the taxpayer itemizes and properly deducts the inter-
est expense, if that deduction is “below the line” it will only reduce taxable 
income; it will not reduce adjusted gross income.  Including the economic 
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value of the interest-free loan as gross income and allowing the same 
amount to be deducted “below the line” will result in an increased adjusted 
gross income and the consequent reduction of the amount of miscellaneous 
deductions allowed.48 
Although commending the dissent’s attempt to replace the “rough eq-
uity” of the gross income exclusion by a more precise attribution of income 
and deductions,49 the court nonetheless decided to affirm the Tax Court on 
the basis of Dean II.  Primarily it did so because it felt that the Dean rule 
was established law and that disturbing it would not only be inadvisable 
after twenty years but would also create a conflict between the Fourth and 
Fifth Circuits.50  In addition, the court noted that the dissent merely substi-
tuted one fiction for another: instead of the Dean fiction that an interest-free 
loan produces no economic benefits, the dissent relied on the fiction that 
interest is paid or accrued.51 
Other circuits followed suit.  Although some expressed apprehension 
about the Dean rule and questioned whether they would have decided simi-
larly had the issue arisen as a case of first impression, six circuit courts had 
affirmed the rule by 1982.52  At this point in time, two key questions re-
mained.  The first was whether one of the remaining circuits—despite his 
string of losses, the Commissioner continued litigation—would either 
uphold the Commissioner’s position or adopt a middle-of-the-road ap-
proach such as that championed by Judge Goldberg’s dissenting opinion in 
Martin, thus creating a conflict among the circuits and justifying a petition 
of certiorari for review by the Supreme Court.  The second was whether, 
assuming it were not overturned, the Dean rule would apply when the 
shareholder would not have been entitled to deduct interest had interest in 
fact been paid, such as when the loan proceeds were invested in tax-free 
bonds.  Recall that the Dean Court decided that because the interest would 
have been deductible, the economic benefit inherent in the interest-free loan 
is not gross income.  Was the Dean rule that tax-free loans do not constitute 
gross income or was it that interest-free loans do not constitute gross in-
come only when interest would have been deductible if paid? 
                                                                                                                           
 
48
 Martin, supra note 43, at 1140-42. 
 
49
 Id. at 1134. 
 
50
 Id. at 1144.  The court also expressed concern that the computations involved in implementing 
the construction urged by Judge Goldberg could prove arduous.  Judge Goldberg countered that, as the 
government, in quantifying the benefit, announced its intention to rely on the prime rate of interest, and 
as the taxpayer had agreed that such a rate represents a bargain, the computations required to determine 
taxable income are “a grade school exercise in multiplication.”  
 
51
 Id. at 1133. 
 
52
 See, Suttle, supra note 41; Martin, supra note 43; Beaton v. Comm’r, 664 F.2d 315 (1st Cir. 
1981); Comm’r v. Greenspun, 670 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1982) (although Greenspun did not involve a loan 
from a corporation to its shareholders but rather from a service recipient to a service provider, the court 
nevertheless considered Dean II controlling); Baker v. Comm’r, 677 F.2d 11 (2nd Cir. 1982); Parks v. 
Comm’r, 686 F.2d 408 (8th Cir. 1982). 
54 FIU Law Review [5:41 
The second question reached the Court of Appeal for the Federal Cir-
cuit in Hardee.53  The taxpayers received interest-free loans from a closely-
held corporation and invested the funds largely in tax-free bonds.  In a 3-2 
decision, the court held, not only that Dean was established law and that the 
rule of stare decisis required that it be followed,54 but that Dean stood for 
the proposition that an interest-free loan falls outside the definition of “in-
come” as that term is used in § 61 of the Code.55  Thus, the fact that the 
taxpayers would not have been entitled to a deduction had they paid interest 
is irrelevant.  
When examining the position taken by the Commissioner following 
his non-acquiescence in 1973, one can hardly avoid wondering how the 
Commissioner could have pressed the argument that, on the one hand, the 
economic benefit inherent in an interest-free loan constitutes gross income, 
but that, on the other, the taxpayer was not entitled to a deduction even in 
those circumstances where interest would have been deductible if paid.56  
To explain the apparent absurdity of the Commissioner’s approach, consid-
er a situation in which (a) a corporation lends $1,000, interest-free, to its 
shareholder, and (b) the shareholder then lends the money to a third party 
and charges full market interest of ten percent.  At the end of the year, the 
third party will pay the shareholder $1,100.  The shareholder will pay the 
corporation $1,000.  Clearly the economic gain to the shareholder from the 
described transactions is $100. 
What would the shareholder’s taxable income be, according to the 
Commissioner?  The economic benefit inherent in the interest-free loan, 
equal to $100, is gross income.  The $100 interest received from the third 
party is also gross income.  On the other hand, the shareholder, who was not 
charged interest by the corporation, would not be entitled to a deduction.  
Taxable income would be $200, even though the total economic gain is 
only $100.57  Is it any wonder, one may ask, that the courts rejected the po-
sition advanced by the Commissioner? 
The case law is equally difficult to fathom.  Why should the fact that 
interest would have been deductible had it been paid mean that the loan 
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itself does not constitute gross income?  Most surprising is Hardee, in 
which the economic benefit inherent in the interest-free loan was held not to 
constitute gross income even though interest, had it been paid, would not 
have been deductible.  
As a prelude to answering these questions, it would be helpful to flesh 
out in greater detail the implied reasoning of both the Commissioner and 
the courts.  The Commissioner’s line of reasoning may have run as follows: 
(a) Interest-free use of corporate funds is similar to rent-free use of 
corporate property. 
(b) Rent-free use of corporate property by shareholders is gross in-
come in the hands of the shareholders.58 
(c) From (a) and (b), the interest-free use of corporate funds consti-
tutes gross income in the hands of the shareholders. 
(d) The shareholders did not pay nor were they obliged to pay inter-
est. 
(e) For income tax purposes, a corporation that lends money interest-
free to its shareholders does not conceptually receive interest.59 
(f) From (e), shareholders who borrow money interest-free cannot be 
considered as having conceptually paid interest. 
(g) From (d) and (f), the shareholders are not entitled to any interest 
deduction. 
(h) From (c) and (g), an interest-free loan from a corporation to its 
shareholder constitutes gross income with no potentially offsetting in-
terest deduction. 
For their part, the courts could not agree with the Commissioner’s 
conclusion that a taxpayer with $100 of economic gain could have $200 of 
taxable income (and, at the then-prevailing tax rate of 70 percent, a tax lia-
bility of $140).  Their implied reasoning was teleological: 
(a) Assume that shareholders borrow $1,000 interest-free from a cor-
poration and lend that money to a third party at the market rate, the 
shareholders receiving interest of $100. 
(b) The shareholders’ economic gain is $100. 
(c) Shareholders should be taxed on an amount equal to (and in any 
case not exceeding) economic gain. 
(d) From (b) and (c), taxable income should be $100. 
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(e) As the shareholders neither paid nor were they obliged to pay in-
terest, either actually or conceptually, they are not entitled to an inter-
est deduction.60 
(f) Taxable income is the difference between gross income and de-
ductions (gross income – deductions = taxable income).61 
(g) From (f), gross income is the sum of taxable income and deduc-
tions (taxable income + deductions = gross income). 
(h) From (d), taxable income is $100.  From (e), deductions are $0.  
Therefore, from (g), gross income is $100 + $0 = $100. 
(i) Gross income is the sum of the interest received from the third 
party and the taxable benefit of the interest-free loan (gross income = 
interest received + taxable benefit of the loan). 
(j) From (h), the taxable benefit of the interest-free loan is the differ-
ence between the shareholders’ total gross income and the interest re-
ceived from the third party (taxable benefit of the loan = gross income 
– interest received). 
(k) From (j), (h), and (a) the taxable benefit of the interest-free loan is 
$100 - $100 = $0.  In other words, the interest-free use of corporate 
funds is not gross income in the hands of the shareholders. 
The common presumption relied upon by both the Commissioner (line 
(d)) and by the courts (line (g)) was that the shareholders were not entitled 
to an interest deduction for use of the corporate funds, even though the 
funds were used for the purpose of generating income.  It was from here 
that their paths diverged; the Commissioner concluded that the interest-free 
loan is gross income with no corresponding deduction, the courts concluded 
that there must not be any gross income in the first place. 
Judge Goldberg’s dissent in Martin challenged that presumption.  De-
scribing the Commissioner’s argument that the shareholders are not entitled 
to an interest deduction as “technical, literal and myopic,”62  Judge Gold-
berg viewed the substance of the transaction as a loan at full interest along 
with a dividend equal to amount of that interest.  The dividend is gross in-
come, while the interest constructively paid may be deductible, depending 
on the facts of the particular case.63 
As persuasive as Judge Goldberg’s argument is, it contains a crucial 
omission.  Judge Goldberg ignored the effect of his construction on the cor-
poration.  If an interest-free loan is viewed as a loan at market interest 
                                                                                                                           
 
60
 See I.R.C. § 163(a) (2006). 
 
61
 I.R.C. § 63(a) (2009). 
 
62
 Martin, 649 F.2d at 1136. 
 
63
 See supra notes 45-48 and the surrounding text. 
2009] Tax Consequences of Shareholders' Rent-Free Use of Corp. Prop. 57 
coupled with a dividend payment equal to the amount of the interest, then 
the corporation should report as income the interest conceptually received.  
Thus, Judge Goldberg’s line of reasoning leads to the conclusion that the 
principle established in Combs Lumber should be overturned, and yet no-
where is his opinion does he suggest doing so.64 
The symbiotic connection between Combs Lumber, on the one hand, 
and Dean II, on the other, was hinted at by several of the judges who consi-
dered the Commissioner’s argument in the cases following Dean II.  For 
example, in explaining its affirmation of the principle underlying Dean II, 
the Hardee court wrote:65 
Since we do not reach our result by imputing to the borrower an inter-
est payment and a corresponding interest deduction, we are not theo-
retically constrained to impute interest income to the corporation. 
A similar thought was expressed in a dissent by Tax Court Judge 
Nims, the only judge who accepted the position advanced by the Commis-
sioner:66 
The majority opinion, following the Dean [II] rationale, in effect pro-
vides petitioner a constructive interest deduction with which to offset 
the conceded income.  If this approach is pursued, the Court may ex-
pect to be eventually confronted with a case in which the Commis-
sioner asserts imputed interest income to the lender—a quid pro quo 
for the constructive deduction allowed the borrower.  One can easily 
visualize this occurring, for example, in the stockholder-controlled 
corporation context. 
Thus it would appear that the roots of both the Commissioner’s posi-
tion and the Dean II rule can be traced to Combs Lumber.  One solution to 
the dilemma would have been to overturn Combs Lumber and hold that a 
corporation lending money interest-free to its shareholders must report as 
income the interest it would have received had it lent the money at full 
market interest.  If the corporation were viewed as having received interest, 
there would be no impediment, in the appropriate circumstances, of permit-
ting an interest deduction to the shareholders.  If an interest deduction were 
possible, the courts would be able to consider the interest-free use of funds 
as gross income to the shareholders: where the notional interest payments 
were deductible, they would offset the gross income; where they were not, 
the shareholders would realize taxable income.  However, there is no indi-
                                                                                                                           
 
64
 The two-transaction approach found support in the literature of the time.  See, e.g., Robert I. 
Keller, The Tax Treatment of Interest-Free Loans: A Two Transaction Approach, 1 VA. TAX REV. 241 
(1981); G.F.I., The Income Tax Treatment of Interest-Free Loans, 1 VA. TAX REV. 137 (1981). 
 
65
 Hardee v. United States, 708 F.2d 661,666 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
 
66
 Greenspun v. Comm’r, 72 T.C. 931,957-58 (1979), aff’d 670 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1982). 
58 FIU Law Review [5:41 
cation that any court seriously considered overturning Combs Lumber and 
imputing income to the corporation. 
D.  Gift Tax Consequences of Interest-Free Loans 
Perhaps due to the uniformity among the circuits, the Supreme Court 
did not consider the income tax consequences of interest-free loans from 
corporations to their shareholders.  However, it did consider a seemingly 
related issue.  In Dickman, the Court held that an interest-free loan from 
one individual to another constitutes a gift for the purposes of gift tax.67 
Ostensibly, Dickman would appear to undermine Dean II.  If the inter-
est-free use of money is recognized as a valuable benefit, the conferring of 
which can obligate the lender to pay gift tax, then the receipt of such a ben-
efit should, in the absence of a statutory exclusion, constitute income.68  To 
emphasize the connection between the two cases, recall that one of the rea-
sons the Dean II court gave for holding that interest-free use of money does 
not constitute gross income was that the court had “heretofore given full 
force to interest-free loans[.]”69  As already noted, the court apparently did 
not mean that it had previously derived the tax consequences of interest-
free loans from the presumption that they were actually interest free.  Such 
a presumption would not have saved the Dean’s from recognizing gross 
income; in fact, the Commissioner’s position explicitly relied on the pre-
sumption that the loan actually was interest free.  Rather, what the court 
meant was that no tax consequences should flow from interest-free loans;70  
Dickman undermined that presumption.  It was the first time that the Su-
preme Court considered whether an interest-free loan could have tax conse-
quences, and it answered in the affirmative. 
On the other hand, Dickman appears to have little effect on the line of 
reasoning sketched above leading from Combs Lumber to Dean II.  Had the 
Supreme Court held that an interest-free loan is the economic equivalent of 
a loan at market interest rates coupled with a transfer from the lender to the 
borrower of an amount of money equal to the interest and should be taxed 
as such,71 the decision would have undermined Combs Lumber, Howell 
Turpentine, and Dean II.  It would have required the corporation to recog-
nize interest income, it would have required the shareholders to recognize 
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dividend income, and it would have allowed the shareholders, in the appro-
priate circumstances, an interest deduction.  But the Supreme Court did not 
so hold.  It held that the interest-free use of money was itself the gift.  In 
other words, it recognized that the loan was actually interest free and that an 
interest-free loan constitutes an economic benefit.72  There is nothing in the 
language or the reasoning of the case from which one can conclude that, for 
tax purposes, the lender should be viewed as having received interest or that 
the borrower should be viewed as having paid interest.  The implicit reason-
ing of the Tax Court and the circuit courts – starting from actual economic 
gain and working backwards to gross income – can remain intact. 
E.  A Comprehensive Legislative Solution – Section 7872 
In 1984, Congress stepped in and imposed a legislative solution to the 
tax consequences of interest-free loans.73  Section 7872 provides that where 
a term loan (which is not a gift loan) carries less that the statutorily pre-
scribed interest rate,74 the lender shall be treated as having transferred to the 
borrower, and the borrower shall be treated as having received from the 
lender, the difference between the amount of the loan and the present value 
(calculated according to the statutorily prescribed rate of interest) of the 
borrower’s future payment obligations under the terms of the loan.75  The 
amount deemed as transferred from the lender to the borrower and received 
by the borrower from the lender will constitute a dividend or compensation, 
depending on the nature of their relationship.  The loan is then considered 
as having original issue discount equal to the amount deemed transferred.76 
To demonstrate, assume that on July 1, 2010, a corporation lends its 
shareholders $1,000 interest-free for a period of one year and the statutorily 
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prescribed interest rate is twenty-five percent.77  According to the terms of 
the loan, the shareholders are obligated to pay the corporation $1,000 on 
July 1, 2011.  The present value of that obligation, as of July 1, 2010, is 
$800.78  According to § 7872, the corporation is deemed as having distri-
buted to its shareholders, and the shareholders are deemed as having re-
ceived from the corporation, a dividend of $200.  The loan is then consi-
dered to have original issue discount of $200.  The tax consequences are as 
follows: 
(a) The corporation will report original issue discount income of 
$200, part of which will accrue in 2010 and part of which will accrue 
in 2011.79 
(b) The shareholders will report a dividend of $200 in 2010. 
(c) The shareholders may be able to take an interest deduction of 
$200, depending on what they did with the borrowed funds.80 
The construction described is appropriate only for term loans.  It is in-
applicable to “demand loans,” loans where the lender has the right to de-
mand repayment at any time, because one cannot calculate on the date the 
loan is made, the present value of future payments.  Therefore, § 7872 pre-
scribes that in the case of demand loans, the lender shall be viewed as hav-
ing paid the borrower, on the last day of each year, an amount equal to the 
difference between the interest that actually accrued and the  interest that 
would had accrued had the loan been made at the statutorily prescribed rate 
of interest.81  The amount deemed paid is considered a dividend, as a gift, or 
as compensation.  Simultaneously, the borrower is viewed as retransferring 
the same amount to the lender as interest.82 
A superficial reading of § 7872 might lead one to the conclusion that 
Congress imposed tax on imputed income and permitted the deduction of 
imputed expenses.  According to this reading, the corporation did not, in 
fact, receive any interest, nor was it entitled to receive any interest; never-
theless, it is taxed as if it did receive income.  Similarly, the shareholders 
did not pay any interest nor were they obliged to pay interest; nevertheless, 
they are deemed to have paid interest and may be entitled to take an interest 
deduction.  With regard to the dividend income of the shareholders, instead 
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 The extraordinarily high interest rate used in the example is to emphasize an important feature 
of § 7872.  With a lower interest rate, the principle would be less obvious.  To avoid unnecessary com-
plications, the example will ignore the semiannual compounding of interest.  See supra note 74. 
 
78
 $1,000/1.25 = $800. 
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 I.R.C. § 1272 (2009). 
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 I.R.C. §163 (2009); I.R.C. § 265 (2009). 
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 I.R.C. §7872(a)(1)(A) (2009). The statutorily prescribed rate of interest for demand loans is the 
short-term Federal rate.  I.R.C. § 7872(f)(2)(B) (2009). 
 
82
 I.R.C. § 7872(a)(1)(B) (2009). 
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of taxing them on the actual interest-free use of corporate funds (a benefit 
the Tax Court and the circuit courts were never willing to subject to taxa-
tion), the Code is taxing them on the cash dividend they would have re-
ceived had the corporation paid them a cash dividend instead of allowing 
them to use its funds interest free.  In other words, the Code solved the is-
sue of whether the free use of corporate funds is income by substituting a 
constructive cash dividend for the interest-free loan.83 
However, a closer analysis will show that § 7872 does not tax imputed 
income, nor does it recognize imputed expenses.  If Congress had intended 
to tax imputed income, i.e., if it had intended to tax the income that the cor-
poration could have earned had it lent its money at market rates, it would 
have provided that, in the case of a term loan, the interest income of the 
corporation, the dividend income of the shareholders, and the possible de-
duction of the shareholders would be equal to the amount of the loan times 
the prescribed interest rate.  Recall the previous example, in which the cor-
poration lent its shareholders $1,000 for a year when the prescribed interest 
was twenty-five percent.  Had the corporation lent its money at the pre-
scribed rate of interest (the Code irrefutably assumes that the prescribed 
interest rate represents the interest rate at which the shareholders could bor-
row money and the return that the corporation could have earned), it would 
have received interest in the amount of $250.  Therefore, if Congress had 
been interested in taxing the corporation on the income that could have 
been earned, Congress would have provided that the corporation’s income 
would be $250 (and that that same amount would be the shareholder’s in-
come and the shareholder’s potential interest deduction).  This Congress did 
not do.  Section 7872 provides that the interest income of the corporation, 
the dividend income of the shareholder, and the shareholder’s potential in-
terest deduction are each only $200. 
What § 7872 does is simply to recharacterize the money transferred 
from the corporation to the shareholder at the time the loan was made.  The 
parties to the transaction called the entire $1,000 a loan.  The Code views it 
otherwise.  Seeing as the present value of the repayment is only $800, the 
Code bifurcates the $1,000 transferred from the corporation to the share-
holders and characterizes $800 of it as a loan and the remaining $200 as a 
dividend.  The shareholder is taxed on the $200 actually received on the day 
the loan was made.  The corporation is taxed on the interest: the difference 
between the amount of the repayment ($1,000) and the amount of the loan 
($800). 
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 See, e.g., Michael C. Hartigan, From Dean and Crown to the Tax Reform Act of 1984: Taxation 
of Interest-Free Loans, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 31, 47 (1984).  For a description of § 7872 from an 
assignment of income perspective, see Brien D. Ward, The Taxation of Interest-Free Loans, 61 TUL. L. 
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The § 7872 recharacterization follows from fundamental income tax 
principles.  Loan proceeds are not taxable because of the corresponding 
obligation to repay the borrowed funds; if and when it becomes apparent 
that the loan will not be repaid in full, the amount that will not be repaid is 
income in the hands of the borrower.84  Section 7872 merely applies that 
principle using a time-value-of-money approach.  When the present value 
of the future repayments is less than the amount of the loan, the borrower 
realizes an accession to wealth at the time the loan is made. 
In enacting § 7872, Congress overturned the case law, but it did so in 
the most unobtrusive way possible: by adopting a construction the courts 
could have adopted based on existing law.  Courts can and often do reject 
the characterization of transactions presented by the parties thereto.  What 
the parties claim to be interest, a loan repayment, or compensation, the 
court can call a dividend.85  What the taxpayer represents as a gift, a court 
can call compensation and vice versa.86  No specific statutory authority is 
needed to effect such a recharacterization.  In other words, in Combs Lumb-
er and in Howell Turpentine, the Board of Tax Appeals and the Tax Court 
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could (and probably should) have bifurcated the cash transfer into a loan 
and a dividend, but instead they accepted the characterization of the pay-
ment as an interest-free loan.  In the words of the Dean II court, Combs 
Lumber and Howell Turpentine gave “full force” to interest-free loans.87  
Congress refused to do so.  From Congress’ perspective, there cannot be 
any such thing as an interest-free loan.  Whatever is equal to the present 
value of the expected payments is a loan.  Anything more is something else, 
the exact nature of which is determined by the relationship between the 
parties.  Where that relationship is corporation-shareholder, the additional 
amount is a dividend. 
The difference between taxing imputed income and recharacterizing 
the payment is crucial for our discussion.  Imputed income is a legal fiction.  
It is income that the taxpayer could have earned but in fact did not.  If in 
our example above, Congress had provided that the corporation’s income 
would be $250, it would have been taxing imputed income: the corporation 
did not earn $250, but it could have and so it is taxed as if it did.  When 
taxation is based upon the recharacterization of a transaction, the taxpayer 
is taxed on income actually earned.88 
In contradistinction to term loans, it might appear that, with regard to 
demand loans, Congress did choose to impose tax on imputed income in-
stead of recharacterizing.  However, the fact that the provisions regarding 
demand loans and those regarding term loans are both part of the same sta-
tutory scheme implies that the same principles should guide their interpreta-
tion.  If the taxation of term loans is based upon recharacterization rather 
than taxation of imputed interest, we should assume, at least initially, that 
the taxation of demand loans is based on a similar construction.  In other 
words, we should first examine how demand loans would be taxed under a 
similar recharacterization model and compare it to the provisions of the 
statute.  Only if it turns out to be impossible to reconcile the term loan con-
struct with the demand loan provisions would we allow that they are based 
on fundamentally different concepts. 
How, then, would we recharacterize a demand loan?  Assume that the 
lender has the right to call the loan in with a single day’s notice.  By not 
calling in the loan on any particular day, the lender is in effect allowing the 
borrower to keep the money for one more day.  As long as the loan is out-
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 It is possible to speculate that one reason Congress chose to recharacterize the transaction 
instead of imposing tax on imputed income was uncertainty regarding the constitutionality of taxing 
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would be to lay a direct tax requiring apportionment.”). 
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standing, the lender is, by his silence, constantly extending the term of the 
loan.89 
Assume that the amount of the loan is $100,000 and that the daily in-
terest is equal to a hundredth of a percent (0.01 percent).  When the loan is 
made, the lender is not promising to let the borrower keep the money for 
more than one day.  So we may treat the transaction as a one-day loan.  The 
present value of the obligation to pay $100,000 in one day’s time is 
$99,990.  Accordingly, we will recharacterize the transfer as being a 
$99,990 interest-bearing loan and an additional $10 whose character will 
depend on the relationship of the parties: where the lender is a corporation 
and the borrower is a shareholder, the $10 will be classified as a dividend. 
The following day, if repayment is not demanded, the corporation is 
simply allowing the shareholder to hold on to the money for an additional 
day.  The debt, including the $10 in accrued interest, is at present $100,000.  
The present value of the obligation to repay the loan the following day, 
should the corporation so demand, is $99,990, so by implicitly extending 
the loan for another day, the corporation is in effect waiving its right to re-
ceive $10.  This waver is a dividend in the hand of the shareholder.  The 
same analysis would apply day-by-day as long as the loan is outstanding. 
The point of the preceding analysis is to demonstrate that the §7872 
demand loan provisions can and should be interpreted as a recharacteriza-
tion and not as the imposition of tax on imputed income.  Since a construc-
tion based upon recharacterization conforms to traditional tax principles, 
while taxing imputed income radically departs from those principles, and 
since the term loan provisions are best understood as a recharacterization, it 
is reasonable similarly to construe the demand loans provisions. 
To sum up what we have seen so far, the tax consequences of interest-
free loans from corporations to their shareholders were extensively ana-
lyzed by courts for over 40 years.  During that period they identified the 
major issues presented by those loans: whether the lender recognizes in-
come, whether the borrower may take an interest deduction, whether the 
borrower recognizes income, and, if so, whether that income is properly 
described as a dividend.  Most crucially, they struggled with the interplay 
among those issues, i.e., how the question of whether the lender has income 
affects the borrower’s possible deduction and how the borrower’s potential 
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 One day is an arbitrary unit, but the same analysis would apply no matter what the time period 
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entitlement to a deduction affects whether the borrower has any gross in-
come.  However, the courts were unable to work out a satisfactory set of 
answers to those questions.  In the end, Congress showed how the courts 
could have developed a consistent and satisfactory model by bifurcating 
what was characterized by the parties as a loan into a loan and a dividend. 
III.  THE NON-APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING SECTION 
7872 TO RENT-FREE USE OF PROPERTY 
In the meantime, the tax consequences of shareholders’ rent-free use of 
corporate property received relatively scant attention by both the judiciary 
and the legislature.  The question of whether a corporation that allows its 
shareholders to use its property rent-free needs to report any income has 
never been addressed by the courts.  The reason for that is simply that the 
Commissioner has never taken the position that the corporation needs to 
report income from such a transaction.  As already noted, prior to the 
enactment of § 7872, the Commissioner had also never taken the position 
that a corporation has taxable income from lending its shareholders money 
interest free; however, that fact did not prevent the Tax Court from address-
ing the issue.  In Combs Lumber and in Society Brand Clothes, the Com-
missioner’s position was that the written documents containing a provision 
for the payment of interest precluded the admissibility of oral evidence 
showing that the corporations, in fact, neither had received nor were en-
titled to receive any interest.  In both instances the court rejected the Com-
missioner’s procedural contention and held that lending money to share-
holders interest-free does not generate gross income for the corporation.90  
There is little room for doubt that the court would arrive at the same 
conclusion were the question of taxing corporations for allowing their 
shareholders to use their property rent-free ever to arise.91  The term “in-
come” in the Code – and possibly also the Constitution – has never been 
held to include income that the taxpayer could have earned but chose not 
to.92  One who uses property in a way that generates less income than it 
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 The doctrine of constructive receipt is not an exception to this principle.  Constructive receipt is 
a timing principle in cash-basis reporting and concerns situations in which a taxpayer is offered cash or 
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he could have received it. 
The doctrine of constructive receipt does apply when the taxpayer waives the right to receive in-
come.  Comm’r v. Giannini, 129 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1942).  In other words, it does not impose tax on 
imputed income.  It merely helps define the terms “receipt” for the purpose of cash-base reporting. 
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could have generated is taxed on the actual income and not on the potential 
income.93 
Has the adoption of §7872 changed this in any way?  True, the scope 
of §7872 is limited to interest-free and low-interest loans; it is not directly 
applicable to rent-free use of property.  Nonetheless, this article has argued 
that § 7872 is not a radical departure from traditional principles of taxation.  
It legislatively imposed a construction the courts could and perhaps should 
have adopted on their own.  Therefore, the question that arises is whether, 
having been shown the way by Congress, the courts could apply the prin-
ciples underlying §7872 to other fact situations.  Specifically, could they, 
using traditional tax principles but guided by §7872, view a corporation that 
purportedly allowed its shareholders to use its property rent-free as having 
actually collected rent and having simultaneously paid a dividend? 
The answer is that they could not.  The principle underlying §7872 is 
the bifurcation and recharacterization of the original transfer of funds from 
the corporation to the shareholder.  That a certain amount of money was 
transferred from the corporation to the shareholder is a fact.  Determining 
the nature of the funds transfer is a question of interpreting those facts.  
Calling part of the payment a loan and part of it a dividend, even when the 
corporation and the shareholder both called it a loan, is not counterfactual.  
It is a different way of interpreting those same facts. 
Consider now the case of rent-free use of property.  In the English lan-
guage, the words “lend” and “borrow” are equally applicable to both prop-
erty and money.  However, this semantic detail must not obscure the fact 
that lending or borrowing property is conceptually different than lending or 
borrowing money.  When one lends another one’s property, title remains in 
the hands of the lender.94  The borrower acquires no more than the right 
temporarily to use that property.  On the other hand, when one lends anoth-
er one’s money, the money then belongs to the borrower.  The lender agrees 
to waive his right to the money and in exchange he receives the promise of 
the borrower.  A jus in personam has replaced a jus in rem. 
When a corporation lends money to a shareholder, the money becomes 
the shareholder’s.  Where the interest rate is too low, we can say that part of 
that money is a dividend and that, in present value terms, only the remaind-
er needs to be repaid.  On the other hand, when a corporation lends property 
to its shareholders, what the shareholders receive is merely the right to use 
the property, and the difference between the use value of the property and 
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 In cases where the borrower is not obligated to return the specific property borrowed but may 
return similar property (as in the proverbial cup of flour), the transaction is conceptually closer to bor-
rowing money than to borrowing property. 
2009] Tax Consequences of Shareholders' Rent-Free Use of Corp. Prop. 67 
the rent actually paid is a taxable benefit.  But as the corporation had not 
transferred title to the shareholders, there is nothing that can be bifurcated 
and recharacterized.  
Thus, § 7872 focuses, in effect, on the one trait that distinguishes in-
terest-free use of money, on the one hand, from rent-free use of property or 
any other service, on the other.  If interest-free loans are given “full force” 
for tax purposes, that is, if the tax law were to recognize that a loan actually 
can be interest-free and were to derive the tax consequences from that as-
sumption, then the tax treatment of interest-free loans and rent-free use of 
property would be identical: in both cases the shareholder is receiving from 
the corporation a service free of charge.  But with the legislation of § 7872, 
the Code no longer proceeds from that presumption. 
It is noteworthy that, although the issue of taxing interest-free loans 
arose primarily within the context of the corporation-shareholder relation-
ship, the scope of § 7872 is considerably broader and encompasses almost 
all instances of interest-free loans.95  It applies even to what it refers to as 
“gift loans,” that is to money lent without interest or at a low rate of interest 
as a favor from one individual to another.96  A person who, as a favor, al-
lows another to use her property is not taxed on the fair market rent.  The 
single exception to the rule that volunteering services does not produce 
gross income for the service provider is the giving of an interest-free loan, 
and the reason is that the Code does not view the money transferred as an 
interest-free loan.  It views part of the money as an interest-bearing loan 
and part of it as a gift. 
IV.  TAXING SHAREHOLDERS’ RENT-FREE USE OF CORPORATE PROPERTY 
A.  Use Value as Income and Deduction of Use Value 
As we saw, case law held that a corporation lending money interest-
free to its shareholders realizes no gross income.97  Furthermore, we saw 
that the courts and Commissioner both used that rule as a starting point for 
their analyses of the tax consequences of the loan as far as the shareholders 
were concerned, but that they arrived at radically different conclusions.  
The Commissioner, we posited, reasoned that, if the corporation did not 
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actually or conceptually receive any interest, then the shareholders did not 
actually or conceptually pay any interest; if the shareholders did not actual-
ly or conceptually pay any interest, they are not entitled to an interest de-
duction; the use of money, like the use of property, is a taxable benefit; 
therefore, the shareholder should be taxed on the economic benefit inherent 
in the loan with no possibility of a corresponding deduction, even if the 
money is used by the shareholder to produce taxable income.98  The courts, 
on the other hand, implicitly reasoned as follows: if the corporation did not 
actually or conceptually receive any interest, then the shareholders did not 
actually or conceptually pay any interest; if the shareholders use the money 
to earn taxable income, taxing them on both the income thus earned and on 
the economic value of the no-interest loan with no corresponding deduction 
is clearly unjustified; therefore, the economic value of the loan cannot be 
included in gross income.99  As noted, neither of these lines of reasoning is 
satisfactory.  In cases where the money is used to produce taxable income, 
the Commissioner’s position leads to double taxation.  In cases where the 
money is used in such a way that interest, had it been paid, would not be 
deductible, the courts’ reasoning leads to undertaxation.  
A corporation that allows its shareholders to use its property rent-free 
does not recognize income.100  This principle would seem to return us to the 
dilemma of choosing either (a) to tax the shareholders on the economic 
value of the rent-free use and end up double taxing them when the property 
is subleased or otherwise used to generate income, or (b) not to tax the 
shareholders on the economic value of the rent-free use and allow them to 
avoid tax completely when they consume the property’s use value.  Without 
referring to this dilemma or the problem of shareholders’ deducting rent in 
the appropriate circumstances, the courts have held that rent-free use of 
corporate property by shareholders is a taxable benefit.101  The result of the 
case law would seem to be that where the shareholders sub-lease the prop-
erty they are double taxed: both the economic benefit of the free use of the 
property and the rent from the sub-lessee would be gross income in the 
hands of the shareholders, while, not having actually or constructively paid 
any rent, they would have no corresponding deduction.  
This conclusion is neither justified nor necessary.  The Commission-
er’s and the courts’ implicit lines of reasoning sketched above share a 
common element besides the starting point that – stated in broader terms 
instead of specifically interest-free loans – a corporation performing a ser-
vice for its shareholders recognized no gross income.  The additional com-
mon element is the inference that because the corporation did not actually 
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or conceptually receive any compensation for the service the shareholders 
are not entitled to a deduction.  This inference needs to be examined. 
Judge Goldberg’s dissent in Martin argued – again, stated in more 
general terms – that in the corporation-shareholder context a free service is 
the equivalent of a service sold for cash along with a corresponding cash 
dividend equal to the price of the service.  By analogy, if in the latter case 
the shareholders, having actually paid for the service, would be entitled to a 
deduction, they should also be entitled to a deduction in the former.  The 
Commissioner’s reliance on the letter of the law must fail, as substance 
must triumph over form.102  
As we noted earlier, the argument that shareholders should be able to 
deduct expenses that they would have incurred had the transaction been 
structured in a different but economically equivalent manner is problematic.  
In the alternative transaction the corporation would have received consider-
ation (interest, rent, etc.) for the service it provided and would have had to 
include that amount in its gross income.103  Judge Goldberg did not propose 
as much and several judges noted that they refrained from viewing the 
shareholder as having income and a corresponding deduction precisely to 
avoid such a result.104  
However, we do not need to involve virtual words, where transactions 
were structured differently than were in fact, in order to allow the share-
holders to deduct the value of the services they received.105  
In Philadelphia Park Amusement,106 the question that arose was the ba-
sis of property acquired in a barter transaction.  Assume that a taxpayer 
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ment is not so attentive to economic reality when it argues further that the taxpayer may not deduct 
that imputed value because it is not actually "interest paid" within the language of § 163.  677 F.2d 
at 12. 
A similar point was made in dictum by the Tax Court in Greenspun: 
A . . . no-interest loan as a form of compensation in kind is indistinguishable [from] an interest-
bearing loan accompanied by an increase in compensation and should be treated accordingly.  
Hence, if a taxpayer…is to be charged with gross income . . . he may be entitled, depending on the 
facts, to an offsetting deduction under § 163(a) . . . . [T]he parties do not dispute that if petitioner 
had in fact paid the additional interest in question to [the lender], such interest would have been 
fully deductible….  That being so, whether or not we base our decision on Dean, the result will be 
the same.  72 T.C. at 952. 
  
103
  Supra note 64 and the surrounding text. 
 
104
   Hardee v. United States, 708 F.2d 661 at 666 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Greenspun v. Comm’r, 72 T.C. 
931 at 957-58 (Nims, J., dissenting) (1979), aff’d, 670 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 
105
 The text is assuming that the deduction would have been permissible had the shareholders paid 
for the service instead of receiving it for free. 
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trades asset A for asset B.  What is the basis of asset B?  Ordinarily, the 
basis of an asset is what is paid for it.107  Since the taxpayer purchased asset 
B with asset A, it would seem to follow that the basis of asset B is the fair 
market value of asset A at the time of the trade.  However, this turns out to 
be inaccurate.  The court explained that the basis of asset B is not the value 
of asset A at the time of the trade, but rather the value of asset B at the time 
of the trade.108  
The reason for this counterintuitive result is that at the time of the 
trade, the taxpayer reports a gain or loss on the exchange of asset A.  The 
“amount realized” for computation of that gain or loss is the value of what 
is received in return, in this case the value of asset B.109  The finishing point 
for computing the gain or loss from asset A needs now to be the starting 
point for computing gain or loss from asset B.  
Assume the following facts: 
The basis of asset A was 300. 
The fair market value of asset A at the time of the exchange was 500.  
The fair market value of asset B at the time of the exchange was 550.  
 The taxpayer later sold asset B for 700.  
The gain on the sale of asset A is the difference between what was received 
in exchange for that asset minus the basis of that asset.  What was received 
was asset B, worth 550.  As the basis of asset A was 300, the gain is clearly 
250. 
The taxpayer now sells asset B.  The amount realized is 700.  If the ba-
sis of asset B is the value of asset A at the time of the exchange (on the 
seemingly reasonable theory that the taxpayer “paid” asset A to acquire 
asset B), then the gain on the sale of asset B would be 200, and the taxpay-
er’s total gain from the two transactions would be 450.  But this result does 
not conform to economic reality.  In truth the taxpayer, who started with 
300 and ended with 700, gained a total of only 400 from the two transac-
tions.  
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108
 Where asset B is difficult to value, the court might assume that it is equal to asset A, for which 
it was traded in a commercial transaction, but this is merely a rebuttable factual presumption.  Infra note 
112.  In Philadelphia Park Amusement, the circuit court, having determined that the basis of asset B was 
its value at the time it was received, remanded for the purpose of determining what that value was.  It 
instructed the lower court that it might take into consideration the value of asset A at the time of the 
exchange, but that the determination of asset A’s value is not dispositive. 
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 I.R.C. § 1001(b) (2009) (“The amount realized from the sale or other disposition of property 
shall be the sum of any money received plus the fair market value of property (other than money) re-
ceived.”). 
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What is the source of the discrepancy?  The problem is that at the time 
of the exchange the government took its share of the increase in the taxpay-
er’s wealth up to 550.  Therefore, in the future the government should have 
the right to participate only in the increase above 550.  If the taxpayer sells 
asset B for 550, his wealth has not increased beyond the level for which he 
has already paid tax and he should owe no more taxes.  If, as here, he sells 
asset B for 700, his accession to wealth is 150.  Taxable gain can be made 
to conform to accession to wealth by assigning to asset B a basis equal to 
the “amount realized” on the sale of asset A, i.e. the fair market value of 
asset B at the time of the exchange.  
Where the asset received is worth less than the asset given in ex-
change, the result of using what was paid for an asset as its basis would be 
undertaxation, as demonstrated by the following example: 
The basis of asset A was 300.  
The fair market value of asset A at the time of the exchange was 550.  
The fair market value of asset B at the time of the exchange was 500.  
The taxpayer later sold asset B for 700.  
Here the gain from the exchange of asset A is 200 (the difference between 
the 500 value received and the basis of 300).  If we use the value of asset A 
at the time of the exchange as the basis of asset B, the result is that the gain 
from the sale of asset B will be 150.  Despite the fact that the taxpayer’s 
total economic gain is 400, the total gain taxed is only 350.  To rectify the 
situation, we need to use as the basis of asset B the value of asset B at the 
time of the exchange.  If the basis of asset B is 500, the taxable gain from 
the sale of asset B will be 200, and the total taxable gain from the two 
transactions will equal the economic gain of 400.  
The principle underlying Philadelphia Park Amusement is that when a 
taxpayer pays tax, the gain (in asset A) on which tax is imposed becomes 
the starting point for the computation of future gains (in asset B).  This 
principle is equally applicable when the taxpayer acquires services.  As-
sume that the taxpayer gives an asset worth 500 and with a basis of 0 to an 
employee in exchange for services worth 550.  The services are used by the 
taxpayer in the production of current income from the business, and the 
question is the amount of the deduction allowable in computing taxable 
business income.  As before, limiting the deduction to what was paid for the 
services – in this case 500 – would result in overtaxation.  The amount rea-
lized on the sale of the asset was 550, and taxable gain was calculated ac-
cordingly.110  In other words, the taxpayer has already paid tax on his acces-
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sion to wealth up to the level of 550.   Allowing a deduction of only 500 
would result in double taxation of 50 of the gain.  To demonstrate, assume 
that the services in question were the only expenses of the business and that 
gross income from the business was 700.  From an economic perspective, 
the taxpayer’s total gain is 700: the asset cost him nothing (basis of 0), he 
traded the asset for services, and he used the services to produce revenue of 
700.  Allowing a deduction of only 500 would mean that taxable gain from 
the business activity is 200.  This is clearly inaccurate.  On the sale of the 
asset the taxpayer reported a gain of 550.  If taxable income from business 
activity is 200, then the total gain on which the taxpayer is taxed will be 
750.111  
Let us now consider shareholders who receive rent-free use of corpo-
rate property.  If the market rent is 500, the shareholders will report a taxa-
ble benefit of this amount.112  Assume now that the shareholders sublease 
the property and manage to get 550 for it.  The 550 must be included in 
gross income.  How much should they be able to deduct in computing taxa-
ble income: what they paid the corporation for the use of the property (0) or 
the amount for which they paid tax when he received the right to use the 
property (500)?  Philadelphia Park Amusement tells us that the once tax 
was paid on the 500, that becomes the starting point for calculation of fu-
ture gain.  By subletting the property for 550, the shareholders realize addi-
tional gain of 50.  Only that 50 should be taxed, and in order to effectuate 
that result, the 500 already taxed must be deducted.   
Rephrasing the same concept, we would say that the shareholders 
could have put the property to personal use and consumed its use value of 
500.  Because they subleased the property on the terms that they did, their 
ability to consume has increased to 550.  This 50 increase in ability to con-
sume is the accession to wealth derived from the lease.  Therefore, taxable 
income from the lease should be 50.  
The difference between the Philadelphia Park Amusement analysis 
and Judge Goldberg’s analysis in Martin is that, in allowing a deduction or 
                                                                                                                           




 The analysis assumes that it is possible to value the services independently of the asset used to 
acquire them.  In practice this is most unlikely. In a barter transaction, when something difficult to value 
is exchanged for something easy to value, a (rebuttable) presumption arises that the former is equal in 
value to the latter.  Since services are usually very difficult to value, they will in almost all cases be 
considered worth what was given in exchange.  United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 at 72 (1962) (“Ab-
sent a readily ascertainable value it is accepted practice where property is exchanged to hold . . . that the 
values of the two properties exchanged in an arm’s length transaction are either equal in fact, or are 
presumed to be equal.”); Philadelphia Park Amusement, 126 F. Supp. at 189. 
Nonetheless, the analysis in the text is relevant for our discussion. When shareholders receive rent-
free use of corporate property, clearly the value of what they receive is greater than the value of what 
they give in exchange. 
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 Supra note 12 and the surrounding text. 
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recognition of basis, the former relies on what actually happened, while the 
latter relies on what could have happened had the parties to the transaction 
structured it differently.  Philadelphia Park Amusement says that the tax-
payer is entitled to a deduction because of the gain on which he previously 
paid tax; Judge Goldberg says that the taxpayer is entitled to a deduction 
because of what he might have paid.113  
The advantage of the Philadelphia Park Amusement approach over the 
Goldberg approach is at least twofold.  First of all, there are often several 
ways of structuring transactions and not always do they have the same tax 
consequences.  For example, a person can donate his services to a charitable 
organization or he can charge for his services and then donate the compen-
sation received.  Does the fact that his pay is taxed in the second instance 
mean that he should be taxed in the first?  Does the fact that he is not taxed 
in the first instance mean that in the second he should not pay tax on his 
compensation?114  Economically equivalent acts are not necessarily taxed 
the same.115  While perhaps regrettable, this is a salient and probably un-
avoidable feature of tax law.   
Secondly, consistency would demand that, when taxing a transaction 
in accordance with the tax consequences of a different although economi-
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 Albeit, if the donation is deductible, the bottom-line results of the two cases might be identical. 
However, the donation may not be deductible – because the organization does not qualify under I.R.C. § 
170, because of the percentage limitations of that section, or because the taxpayer does not itemize 
deductions – in which case taxable income in the second instance will be greater than in the first.  Fur-
thermore, even if the donation is deductible, including the compensation in gross income will increase 
adjusted gross income, affecting, for example, the deductibility of miscellaneous expenses, which are 
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For a discussion of the place of charitable deductions in a normative income tax and of whether the 
economic equivalence of the two situations described in the text is relevant, see William Andrews, 
Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV. 309 (1972); Mark Kelman, Personal 
Deductions Revisited: Why They Fit Poorly in an “Ideal” Income Tax and Why They Fit Worse in a Far 
from Ideal World, 31 STAN. L. REV. 831 (1979). 
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cally equivalent transaction, all parties involved in either the real or the 
virtual transaction would be taxed according to the alternative transaction.  
Specifically, if we tax a person receiving a free service as if she had paid for 
the service and then was refunded the money, we should also tax that per-
son, whether an individual or an entity, who performs the free service as if 
he had been paid and then given the money away.  To the best of my know-
ledge, no one has actually proposed the adoption of such a rule.  As already 
noted, Judge Goldberg himself was noticeably silent with regard to the tax 
consequences vis-à-vis the corporation of giving its shareholders a free ser-
vice.116   
The third advantage – no more than a consequence of the two already 
mentioned – of the Philadelphia Park Amusement rule is predictability and 
consistency.  Whenever income tax is paid, the taxed gain, unless it is con-
sumed, will constitute the starting point for the computation of further gain.  
With the Goldberg approach it is never certain when the approach will be 
implemented, which alternative transaction’s tax consequences will be 
adopted, and whom they will affect.  A separate or supplemental set of 
rules, explaining when, how and to whom the approach should be applied, 
would need to be iterated.117   
What we have seen so far is (a) that allowing its shareholders to use its 
property rent-free does not constitute or generate taxable income for the 
corporation, (b) that rent-free use of corporate property constitutes a taxable 
benefit in the hands of shareholders, and (c) that the value of that rent-free 
use of property is deductible by the shareholders if the property is subleased 
or is otherwise used to generate current income.  It is noteworthy that only 
(b) has explicit support in the case law.  There is no direct judicial support 
for (a), although it is implicit in Combs Lumber and Society Brand 
Clothes.118  With regard to (c), Judge Opper, concurring in the result reached 
by the court in Dean II, opined that where shareholders receive rent-free 
use of corporate property, which they then sublease, they “could presuma-
bly deduct . . . the hypothetical rental value theoretically paid . . . to the 
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of analyzing barter transactions rather than provision of services from corporations to their controlling 
shareholders.  In a barter transaction, each party realizes actual income, albeit not in the form of cash. 
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providing uncompensated services to their shareholders, corporations do not receive any income, neither 
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corporation.”119  However, this presumption has never been tested.  Fur-
thermore, the parallel question that arose prior to the enactment of § 7872 in 
relation to interest-free loans – that is, whether or not shareholders were 
entitled to an interest deduction – was answered in the negative.120  As we 
have seen, the conceptual difficulty the courts encountered regarding allow-
ing a deduction for interest neither paid nor accrued prevented them from 
reaching a satisfactory resolution of the taxation-of-interest-free-loans di-
lemma and precipitated the imposition of a legislative solution. 
 
B.  Is Allowing Shareholders Rent-Free Use of Corporate Property a Distri-
bution? 
One question, lying at the heart of the issue, remains to be discussed:  
How should the benefit inherent in the rent-free use of corporate property 
by shareholders be classified?  Specifically, is the income attributable to 
such shareholders properly considered a distribution for tax purposes?121  
One’s first reaction to such questions might be to reread them in search of 
some deeper meaning, since the answers to the questions as phrased appear 
too simple to warrant discussion.  The benefit concerned was received by 
the taxpayers by virtue of their being shareholders in the corporation distri-
buting that benefit.  How could this not be a distribution?  
Nonetheless, this article will argue that the benefit of using corporate 
property by shareholders, while it is income under the Code, it is not a dis-
tribution.  Although perhaps counterintuitive, it is mandated both by the 
express language of the Code and, much more significantly, by substantive 
considerations.  Section 301(a) of the Code introduces the subject of corpo-
rate distributions by providing that “a distribution of property (as defined 
in §317(a)) made by a corporation to a shareholder in respect to its stock 
shall be taxed in the manner provided in §(c).”  Section 317(a) defines 
“property” as “money, securities, and other property[.]”  In other words, § 
301(c), which describes the tax consequences of distributions, applies only 
to the distribution of money, securities, and other property.  It does not ap-
ply to distributions of services. 
The language of § 316(a), which defines the term “dividend,” is con-
sistent with the language of §§ 301(a) and 317(a).  Section 316 defines 
“dividend” as “any distribution of property made by a corporation to its 
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 The text uses the broad term “distribution” instead of the more narrow term “dividend,” de-
fined as a distribution out of earnings and profits as opposed to a distribution of capital.  I.R.C. § 316 
(2009).  Only after it is determined that what is received is a distribution can possible classification as a 
dividend be considered.  For several courts’ consideration of the relationship between classification of 
the benefit as a dividend and the existence of earnings and profits, see infra note 130. 
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shareholders . . . out of earnings and profits[.]”  Again, the distribution of 
services will not be considered a dividend. 
On the other hand, there is nothing in the language of § 61 to exclude 
from the definition of gross income services (including rent-free use of 
property) received by shareholders.  There is clearly an economic benefit, 
and, as income is not limited to cash receipts only, such economic benefit 
must be considered income.  The language of the Code leads us inexorably 
to the conclusion that rent-free use of corporate property by shareholders is 
income but not a distribution for purposes of § 301.  
Nonetheless, the conclusion that rent-free use of corporate property by 
shareholders is not a distribution cannot rely exclusively on the language of 
the Code.  There are instances in which the Code refers in a definition only 
to “property,” and yet services are implicitly included.  For example, take 
the definition of “amount realized” in §1001(b): “The amount realized from 
the sale of other disposition of property shall be the sum of any money re-
ceived plus the fair market value of the property (other than money) re-
ceived.”  A taxpayer trades property for services.  What is the amount rea-
lized for the purpose of computing gain or loss?  As the taxpayer received 
no money and no property, a strict interpretation of § 1001(b) would force 
us to arrive at the conclusion that the amount realized is zero.  This result is 
clearly unjustified.  Therefore, without any explicit statutory anchor, the 
courts have included the fair market value of services received as part of the 
amount realized.122 
If, from a substantive perspective, it were clear that services from a 
corporation to its shareholders should be considered a distribution, it could 
be argued that, notwithstanding the apparently unambiguous language of 
the Code, the terms “distribution” and “dividend” must be read so as to 
include services.  However, the opposite is the case.  For a number of subs-
tantive reasons, unrelated to the language of the Code, it is clear that servic-
es should not be considered distributions. 
Distributions are either distributions of earnings and profits (in which 
case they are termed “dividends”) or they are distributions of capital.123  The 
Code provides that dividends are taxed as ordinary income124 – albeit sub-
ject at present to a preferred rate of tax when the shareholder is an individu-
al125 or entitling the shareholder to a dividend received deduction when it is 
a corporation126 – and that distributions in excess of earnings and profits 
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reduce the basis of the appropriate shares.127  Once basis has been reduced 
to zero, additional distributions in excess of earnings and profits are consi-
dered capital gain.128 
Distribution of services is neither the distribution of earning and prof-
its nor the distribution of capital.  Assume that a corporation with no earn-
ings and profits buys land, which it allows its shareholders to use rent-free.  
The use of the property is income in the hands of the shareholders.  Is it a 
dividend?  No, because the corporation has no earnings and profits.  Is it for 
tax purposes a distribution of capital?  Again, the answer is no.  The corpo-
ration could continue to allow its shareholders to use the land forever with-
out depleting its capital.  Assume that the cost of the land is $1,000 and that 
fair market rent is $100 a year.  Ignoring possible fluctuation in the value of 
the land, if the land were the only asset of the corporation and it had no 
liabilities, the corporation’s capital would be $1,000 and would remain 
$1,000 forever.  If in fact it were distributing $100 a year (the rent-value of 
the land), one would expect that after ten years its capital would be dep-
leted.  As the service is neither a dividend nor a distribution of capital, it 
cannot be considered a distribution.129 
To demonstrate further why the service cannot be considered a distri-
bution, let us assume that a taxpayer owns a parcel of land he wishes to rent 
out for $100 a year.  Were he to do so directly, he would be taxed at full 
income tax rates on the rent received.  Instead, he sets up a corporation and 
contributes the land to the capital of the corporation.  The corporation then 
allows the shareholder to use the property rent-free and the shareholder 
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sublets it for $100 a year.  The corporation has no gross income.130  The 
shareholder had a total of $200 of gross income: $100 from the use of cor-
porate property and an additional $100 rent received from the third party.  
On the other hand, seeing as the use of the property is serving to generate 
income, the use-value, which was included in his gross income, is deducti-
ble.131  The result is as follows: 
 
Income from use of corporate property  $100 Income from rent   $100 
Deductions                            ------    Deduction of use-value ($100) 
Taxable Income                        $100                              $0  
After deducting the use-value from the rent received, the taxpayer is 
left with $100 of income from the rent-free use of corporate property.  If he 
is allowed to pay the tax for this income at the reduced rates applicable to 
dividends, he will end up paying less than had he simply rented out the 
land.  Through the technique described, he will have succeeded in trans-
forming rent into a dividend.132 
This example and the previous analysis make clear that the rent-free 
use of corporate property by shareholders must not, and should not, be con-
sidered a dividend.  It should be classified as ordinary income taxable at 
ordinary rates. 
V.  RENT-FREE USE OF PROPERTY V. RENTING AT MARKET RATES AND 
DISTRIBUTING THE RENT RECEIVED 
In Martin, Judge Goldberg argued that one who borrows money inter-
est-free is in an identical position to one who pays interest and then receives 
either compensation or a dividend equal to the amount of the interest; there-
fore, the tax consequences should be the same.133  Applying that line of rea-
soning to the question of classifying the benefit, we could say that the rent-
free use of corporate property is economically equivalent to the payment of 
rent to the corporation and the subsequent distribution of the rent received.  
In such a case, the income would be a distribution (i.e., a dividend if the 
corporation has sufficient earnings and profits, or a distribution of capital if 
not).  Therefore, the income in the economically equivalent scenario of 
rent-free use should be the same: the benefit is a distribution. 
Judge Goldberg’s analysis proceeds from the assumption that econom-
ically equivalent transactions should be taxed the same.  We saw earlier, 
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though, that tax law does not always treat economically equivalent transac-
tions similarly.134  For example, Judge Goldberg’s analysis focused exclu-
sively on the shareholder.  It did not address the tax liability of the corpora-
tion.  A consistent application of the principle that economic equivalence 
entails similar tax treatment would require that the corporation be taxed on 
the income it would have earned had it rented out its property at market 
rates.  Nonetheless, Judge Goldberg did not extend his equivalence argu-
ment to the corporation, and it is fairly obvious why he did not: imposing 
tax because a taxpayer could have experienced an accession to wealth vi-
olates long-standing income tax principles and might even be beyond Con-
gress’ constitutional mandate.  As we have seen, §7872 circumvented the 
problem of imposing tax on imputed income by bifurcating and recharacte-
rizing the loan proceeds so that tax is imposed on income actually re-
ceived.135  On the other hand, seeing as the recharacterization technique of 
§7872 is unavailable in the case of rent-free use of property, imposing tax 
on a corporation that allowed shareholders to use its property rent-free 
would necessarily involve taxing income the corporation could have earned, 
but in fact did not. 
The inapplicability of the equivalence principle – the principle that 
economically equivalent transactions should be taxed the same – to the cor-
poration is more than simply a counterexample to prove that the principle is 
unreliable as a determinant of tax consequences.  The fact that the corpora-
tion receives no income for the performance of its service directly impacts 
the nature of the benefit received by the shareholders.  When a corporation 
receives rent and distributes that rent to its shareholders, the distribution is 
out of earnings: the profit being distributed is the rent that was received 
from the shareholder/lessee.  In contrast, when a corporation allows its 
shareholders to use its property rent-free, the corporation, ex hypothesi, 
receives no rent income and there are no profits to distribute. 
Nonetheless, the concept of economic equivalence warrants a closer 
look.  Take two scenarios.  In the first, a corporation rents its property to its 
shareholders for market rent and simultaneously distributes a dividend.  The 
shareholders then sublease the property.  The corporation will pay tax on 
the rent it receives and the shareholders will pay tax on the dividend.  The 
shareholders will not pay tax on the rent they receive from the sub-lessee, 
as they will be able to deduct the rent they paid to the corporation.136  In the 
second scenario, the corporation allows its shareholders to use its property 
rent-free and they, again, sublease it to a third party.  The shareholders will 
pay tax on the use-value of the property at ordinary rates.  They will not pay 
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tax on the rent they receive from the third party; as the use-value of the 
property was included in their gross income, they can deduct that use-value 
when it contributes to the production of income.137  The difference between 
the two scenarios is that in the first, the corporation pays tax at the corpo-
rate rate and the shareholders pay tax at dividend rates, while in the second 
the shareholders pay tax at ordinary rates.  Where the shareholders are indi-
viduals, this means that in the first scenario the total tax burden is equiva-
lent to the tax burden on distributed corporate income, while in the second 
the tax burden is the same as that imposed on income derived directly by an 
individual.138  Is there a principled justification for imposing different total 
tax burdens in the two scenarios?  And if not, does this indicate that there is 
some flaw in the analysis of the tax consequences of the second scenario? 
The answer to the first question is “probably not.”  The answer to the 
second question is “no”; while there is probably no principled justification 
for the difference, this does not indicate a flaw in the analysis.  Actually, the 
opposite is the case.  The difference in total tax burden actually supports the 
conclusions reached regarding the taxing of rent-free use of property by the 
corporation. 
Under a non-integrated or partially integrated corporate tax structure, 
distributed corporate profits normally bear a higher tax burden than income 
earned by an individual.  The question of whether the excess burden is justi-
fied has attracted a great deal of attention in the literature (and finds little 
support, which is why the answer to the first question is “probably not”), 
and a thorough investigation is beyond the scope of this article.  For our 
purposes we will take the excess burden as a given.139 
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When a corporation rents its property (whether to its shareholders or to 
unrelated parties) at market rates and distributes the rent it receives (“the 
first scenario”), the income is earned by the corporation.  When a corpora-
tion allows its shareholders to use its property rent-free and the sharehold-
ers rent out the property at market rates (“the second scenario”), the income 
is earned directly by the shareholders.  A non-integrated or partially inte-
grated tax structure will differentiate between the two.  However, under 
Judge Goldberg’s economic equivalency analysis – if, as consistency re-
quires, it is extended to include the corporation and not only the sharehold-
ers – income earned directly by the shareholders in the second scenario will 
be taxed as if it were distributed corporate earning: the corporation will pay 
tax at the corporate rate and the shareholders will pay tax at the dividend 
rate. 
Whether or not there is a substantive justification for imposing differ-
ent tax burdens on distributed corporate profits as opposed to income 
earned by an individual, if this is the framework within which we are work-
ing, its principles must be respected.  Economic equivalency does not do so: 
it taxes income earned by an individual as if it were earned by a corpora-
tion.  As opposed to the economic equivalency analysis, the position pre-
sented in this article conforms to the basic precepts of the corporate tax 
structure.  As noted, there may be no substantive justification for taxing 
distributed corporate profits differently than earnings by an individual, and 
the article is not suggesting that there is.  Nevertheless, if that is the frame-
work within which we are to work, then the tax consequences should follow 
accordingly.  Thus, the answer to the second question raised above is “no”: 
the fact that economically equivalent transactions are taxed differently does 
not indicate that the analysis is faulty.  If there is a flaw, its source is the 
corporate tax structure not being fully integrated.  Within such a structure, 
the fact that, although economically equivalent, income generated by the 
corporation and distributed, on the one hand, and income generated directly 
by the shareholders, on the other hand, are taxed differently would tend to 
validate the analysis. 
Until 2002, the corporate tax structure in the United States was based 
on a “classic” or double-taxation model, in which income generated by a 
corporation is fully taxed at the corporate level and then taxed again, at full 
rates, at the shareholder level.  Since 2003, dividends in the hands of indi-
viduals have been taxed at reduced rates.140  The relatively low rate of tax 
on dividends, in recognition of the fact that the earnings distributed have 
already been taxed on the corporate level, mark a transition to partial inte-
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gration.141  In a partially integrated model, distributed corporate profits bear 
a higher burden of tax than income generated directly by an individual, but 
a lower burden than they would under a system of full double taxation. 
Under a fully integrated model of corporate taxation, distributed cor-
porate earnings bear a tax burden identical to the tax burden imposed on 
income earned directly by an individual.  As noted, the advantages of full 
integration, both from the perspective of horizontal equity and from the 
perspective of economic efficiency, have been extensively discussed in the 
literature and need not be further addressed here.142  What we do need to 
consider is how the rent-free use of corporate property would be taxed un-
der various schemes of full integration.  We will see that, where the tax 
structure itself equalizes the treatment of distributed corporate earnings 
with that of income generated directly by an individual, so does the pro-
posed analysis of rent-free use of property. 
A number of different models of full integration are possible.  We will 
here consider three basic models.  The first is a dividend exclusion model, 
in which income is fully taxed at the corporate level and shareholders pay 
no additional tax when the (post-tax) earnings are distributed as dividends. 
The exact method by which shareholders are exempt from paying tax on 
their dividends – e.g., excluding dividends from gross income or, alterna-
tively, including dividends in gross income but allowing a credit for taxes 
paid on the corporate level – is irrelevant to our discussion.143  It is impor-
tant, though, that for the dividend exclusion model to be fully integrated, 
the corporate tax rate needs to be equal to the ordinary individual rate.144 
The second method of integration is to exempt corporations from paying 
tax on their income and to tax at ordinary rates dividends received by indi-
viduals.  The primary difference between the dividend exclusion model and 
the corporate exemption model is that in the former income is taxed as it 
accrues in the hands in the corporation, while in the latter income is allowed 
to accumulate tax free as long as it is not distributed.  The third model we 
will consider is a split rate (or two stage) system in which tax is imposed on 
the corporation as earnings accrue and again on shareholders as earnings 
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 In practice this could present a technical problem if individuals are subject to tax at progressive 
(or regressive) rates.  With a fully integrated credit system, distributed corporate earnings will bear the 
same total tax burden as income earned directly by individual shareholders. 
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are distributed, but the tax rate imposed on both corporate earnings and 
dividends is reduced so that the total tax burden on distributed earnings 
equals individual rates.  The split rate system occupies the middle ground 
between the dividend exclusion model and the corporate exemption model. 
The common denominator of all three is that distributed corporate earnings 
and income earned directly by an individual bear the same total tax burden. 
With regard to undistributed earnings, while the dividend exclusion model 
subjects them to tax and the corporate exemption model allows them to 
accumulate tax free, the split rate system subjects them to partial tax.145 
Under a dividend exclusion model, a corporation that rents out its 
property will pay tax on the rent received.  It will then distribute the rent net 
of corporate income tax to its shareholders, who will pay no further taxes. 
Should the corporation instead allow shareholders to use its property rent-
free, it would pay no taxes (as it neither received nor was entitled to receive 
rent), and they would pay tax at ordinary individual rates on the use-value. 
As the corporate tax rate and the individual tax rate is presumptively the 
same, the tax burden on the two methods of structuring the transaction 
would be identical.  Recall that a key component of the proposed analysis is 
that the service provided by the corporation to its shareholders is not a dis-
tribution, but rather ordinary income.  Thus, the economic benefit inherent 
in using corporate property rent-free is not entitled to the exclusion availa-
ble to dividends under the dividend exclusion model. 
Under a corporate exemption model, a corporation that rents out its 
property would pay no tax and would be able to distribute the entire rent to 
its shareholders.  They would then pay tax on what they received.  Share-
holders who, instead, received rent-free use of corporate property would 
pay tax at the same rate on the use-value of that property. 
Finally, under a split rate system, a corporation that rents out its prop-
erty would pay a low corporate tax and distribute the remainder to its 
shareholders as a dividend.  They would then pay tax at the low dividend 
rate.  In contrast, were the corporation to allow shareholders to use corpo-
rate property rent-free, the corporation would not pay tax and the share-
holders would be taxed on the use value at ordinary rates.  Assuming that 
the total burden of corporate tax plus dividend tax equals the individual tax 
rate, as it must if the system is fully integrated, the tax consequences of the 
two scenarios would again be identical. 
A numerical example of the equivalence under the various models is 
annexed to the article. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
When considering the tax consequences of interest-free loans from 
corporations to their shareholders, the courts accepted, at face value, the 
characterization of these loans as “interest free” and ran straight into diffi-
culty.  Starting from the premise that the loans actually were interest free 
and applying traditional principles of income taxation, the courts were una-
ble to arrive at a satisfactory solution to the quandaries surrounding the tax 
consequences of these loans from the perspective of the corporation and the 
shareholder.  Eventually, a legislative solution was imposed.  One might 
conclude that, like the laws of physics when reaching a singularity, tradi-
tional principles of income taxation, upon encountering the enigma of inter-
est-free loans from corporations to shareholders, reach the limits of their 
applicability and need to be replaced by other rules more attuned to the 
reality of that specific situation. 
The position taken by this article, in defense of traditional income tax 
principles, is twofold.  First, the solution adopted by Congress with regard 
to taxing interest free loans is not as radical as might appear.  Congress did 
not impose tax on imputed income, i.e. income that the taxpayer neither 
received nor was entitled to receive.  Rather, Congress provided that what 
the parties to the transaction described as loan proceeds should be bifur-
cated, with an amount equal to the present value of the borrower’s future 
payments characterized as a loan and the remainder constituting a dividend, 
compensation, or a gift, according to the circumstances.  Whatever the rela-
tionship between the parties and subject to certain de minimus exceptions, 
the difference between the nominal amount of the reconstituted loan and the 
nominal amount to be repaid by the borrower constitutes interest in the 
hands of the lender and an interest expense, the deductibility of which de-
pends on the use to which the borrowed funds are put, in the hands of the 
borrower.  Recharacterizing (or bifurcating) a payment conforms to tradi-
tional tax principles and is something that courts have done innumerable 
times in other contexts.  They could and probably should have done so in 
the case of “interest-free” loans. 
Second, even without bifurcating the payment into a loan and a divi-
dend, the courts could still have arrived at a satisfactory solution had they 
applied the principle that when a taxpayer pays tax upon receipt of property 
or services, that property or service acquires a basis, equal to the its value at 
the time of receipt and deductible if and when used for the production of 
income (or used in some other manner that conforms to the general rules for 
deducting expenses).  In other words, although the shareholders did not 
actually pay any interest on the loan, had the economic value of the loan 
been included in their gross income, they should have been allowed, in ac-
cordance with the law at that time, to deduct that same amount as an inter-
est expense unless the borrowed funds had been invested in tax free bonds. 
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The fact that even without bifurcation and recharacterization the courts 
could have arrived at a satisfactory resolution of the tax issues presented by 
interest-free loans is particularly significant with regard to the taxation of 
rent-free use of corporate property.  Unlike interest-free loans (in which 
shareholders acquire full title to the money they receive and are under a 
corresponding obligation to return an equal amount of money to the corpo-
ration), rent-free use of corporate property (where title remains in the hands 
of the corporation and shareholders receive merely the temporary use of 
that property) cannot be bifurcated, so the bifurcation and recharacterization 
construction underlying § 7872 is inapplicable.  Thus, unlike a corporation 
lending money to its shareholders “interest-free”, a corporation allowing 
shareholders to use its property rent-free will not report any income.  For 
their part, the shareholders will report the use value of the property as gross 
income and, despite not having paid the corporation rent for the use of the 
property, will be able to deduct the use value for which they were taxed, if 
the property was subleased by them or otherwise contributed to the produc-
tion of income. 
The article also took the position that, as the rent-free use of corporate 
property by shareholders is neither a distribution of earnings nor a distribu-
tion of capital, it does not constitute a “distribution” for tax purposes.  The 
shareholders will pay tax on the benefit received at ordinary income tax 
rates. 
Thus, the total tax burden for the rent-free use of corporate property by 
individual shareholders will be equal to the ordinary individual tax rate.  On 
the other hand, the total tax burden for the economically equivalent transac-
tion of renting property to shareholders at the market price and then distri-
buting as a dividend the rent received would be that imposed on distributed 
corporate earnings.  In a non-integrated or partially integrated corporate tax 
structure (like the presently prevailing system in the United States), the 
latter will be greater than the former.  Nonetheless, the unequal treatment of 
economically equivalent transactions results, not from any flaw in the anal-
ysis, but from the corporate tax structure itself.  When a corporation rents 
out its property and distributes the rent, shareholders receive distributed 
corporate profits.  When a corporation allows shareholders to use property 
rent-free and they rent it out, the shareholders are generating the income.  
Where the tax burden on distributed corporate profits is greater than the tax 
burden imposed on individuals, one should not be surprised to discover 
specific instances of horizontal inequity. 
To demonstrate that the source of the disparate tax treatment is the 
corporate tax structure and not any flaw in the analysis, the article ex-
amined how the two transactions would be taxed under various full integra-
tion models.  In each of them, economically equivalent transactions bear 
equal tax burdens. 
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APPENDIX 
For the purpose of the computations appearing in this appendix, the 
following will be assumed: 
1. The corporation has $100,000, representing either post-tax earnings 
or shareholder contribution to capital. 
2. The corporation will retain enough cash to cover any potential tax 
liability it might incur. 
3. With the remaining funds it will purchase property for the use of its 
shareholders. 
4. Shareholders will rent the property out at market rates. 
5. The rate of return for all investments (interest or rent) is ten percent. 
6. In all models, individuals are taxed on their ordinary income at the 
rate of forty percent. 
7. Under Full Integration Model I, corporations are taxed at the rate of 
forty percent and dividends are excluded from gross income. 
8. Under Full Integration Model II, corporations are not taxed on their 
income and dividends are taxed at ordinary rates. 
9. Under Full Integration Model III, corporations are taxed on their in-
come at the rate of twenty percent and dividends received by individ-
uals are taxed at the rate of twenty-five percent. 
10. Under the Partial Integration Model, corporations are taxed on 
their income at the rate of forty percent and dividends received by in-
dividuals are taxed at the rate of twenty percent. 
11. Under the Classic Double Taxation Model, corporations are taxed 
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A.  CORPORATION ALLOWS SHAREHOLDERS TO USE PROPERTY 
RENT-FREE 














A Corporate level 
income tax 
 40% 0% 20% 40% 40% 
B Shareholder level 
income tax on 
dividends 
 0% 40% 25% 20% 40% 
C Total tax burden on 
distributed corporate 
profits 
 40% 40% 40% 52% 64% 
D Corporate funds 
available – used to 
purchase property for 
shareholder use 
 100,000 100,000 100,000 100,000 100,000 
E Benefit to share-
holders from use of 
corporate property 
Dx10% 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 
F Tax on use of  
corporate property 
Ex40% 4,000 4,000 4,000 4,000 4,000 
G Shareholders’ rental 
income from 
sublease  
Dx10% 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 
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H Shareholders’  
deduction (use of 
taxed benefit for 
production of  
income) 
E 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 
J Shareholders’  
taxable income  
from sublease 
G-H 0 0 0 0 0 
K Shareholders’ tax on 
sublease 
Jx40% 0 0 0 0 0 




6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 




40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 
14.  
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B. CORPORATION RENTS PROPERTY TO SHAREHOLDERS AND 
DISTRIBUTES AS DIVIDEND RENT RECEIVED  
 














A Corporate level 
income tax 
 40% 0% 20% 40% 40% 
B Shareholder level 
income tax on 
dividends 
 0% 40% 25% 20% 40% 
C Total tax burden on 
distributed  
corporate profits 
 40% 40% 40% 52% 64% 
D Corporate funds 
available 
 100,000 100,000 100,000 100,000 100,000 
E Investment to 
provide for future 
tax liability 
CxA 40,000 0 20,000 40,000 40,000 
F Return on  
investment 
Ex10% 4,000 0 2,000 4,000 4,000 
G Corporate level tax 
on return 
FxA 1,600 0 400 1,600 1,600 
H Return on  
investment net of 
corporate level 
taxes 
F-G 2,400 0 1,600 2,400 2,400 
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J Purchase price of 
property for rent to 
shareholders 
D-E 60,000 100,000 80,000 60,000 60,000 





Jx10% 6,000 10,000 8,000 6,000 6,000 
L Corporate level tax 
on rent (financed 
by net return on 
investment – line H) 
KxA 2,400 0 1,600 2,400 2,400 
M Shareholder level 
tax on dividend 
KxB 0 4,000 2,000 1,200 2,400 
N Shareholders’ gross 
rental income from 
sublease 
Jx10% 6,000 10,000 8,000 6,000 6,000 
P Shareholders’ 
deduction for  
rent paid 




N-P 0 0 0 0 0 




0 0 0 0 0 




6,000 6,000 6,000 4,800 3,600 
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40% 40% 40% 52% 64% 
A comparison of the tables demonstrates that the effective tax of the 
two economically equivalent transactions is identical under all full integra-
tion models. Under non-integrated or partially integrated models, the effec-
tive tax rate of renting property to the shareholders is higher than the effec-
tive tax rate of allowing them free use of the property. This discrepancy is 
due the fact that under non-integrated and partially integrated models, the 
tax burden on distributed corporate earnings is greater than the tax burden 
on income generated directly by an individual. 
